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Time is a universal psychological dimension, but time perception has often been studied and 
discussed in relative isolation. Increasingly, researchers are searching for unifying principles and 
integrated models that link time perception to other domains. In this review, we survey the links 
between temporal cognition and other psychological processes. Specifically, we describe how 
subjective duration is affected by non-temporal stimulus properties (perception), the allocation of 
processing resources (attention), and past experience with the stimulus (memory). We show that 
many of these connections instantiate a ‘processing principle’, according to which perceived time is 
positively related to perceptual vividity and the ease of information-extraction from the stimulus. 
This empirical generalization generates testable predictions and provides a starting-point for the 
development of integrated theoretical frameworks. Our intention is that, by outlining some of the 
links between temporal cognition and other domains, researchers in the field of timing and time 
perception will be encouraged to situate their work within broader theoretical frameworks, whilst 
researchers from other fields will be inspired to apply their insights, techniques, and theorizing to 
improve our understanding of the representation and judgment of time 
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Temporal Cognition: Connecting Subjective Time to Perception, Attention, and Memory 
 
Unlike other physical and perceptual dimensions, time is truly ubiquitous: all stimuli and 
activities have temporal extent, and the perception of time is a universal, continuous experience 
(Allan, 1979; Buhusi & Meck, 2005; Grondin, 2001; Lloyd, & Arstila, 2014; Wittmann, 2013). 
Correspondingly, the judgment of time is central to virtually all behaviours, from basic tasks like 
foraging and communication, to uniquely human activities like deciding which stock portfolio to 
invest in or whether to close a slow-loading webpage. However, unlike other basic dimensions, there 
is no dedicated sense organ for time. Rather, psychological time is an abstraction, a construct or 
epiphenomenon of our mind’s functioning that somehow infiltrates our conscious experience. That 
is, we create subjective time in order to explain the coherence of events (Allman, Yin, & Meck, 2014; 
Callender, 2010; Grondin, 2001, 2010; Macar & Vidal, 2009).  
In keeping with both its importance and its intellectual challenge, time perception has been 
intensively studied since the earliest days of experimental psychology (James, 1890 – see Myers, 
1972). Some of this research has employed psychophysical or behavioural techniques and focussed 
on the development of information-processing models; other work has concerned the neural basis 
of timing, including the effects of pharmacological treatments and the brain regions responsible for 
time perception. Increasingly, researchers have integrated these lines of inquiry by developing 
quantitative models of time perception that are grounded in neurobiology; a number of recent 
papers comprehensively review these contemporary neural and information-processing accounts 
(see e.g., Allman, Teki, Griffiths, & Meck, 2014; Grondin, 2010; Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 2013; 
Wittmann, 2013), and several edited books/special issues contain interesting collections of (often 
empirical) articles (e.g., Grondin, 2008; Merchant & de Lafuente, 2015; Meck, Doyère, & Gruart, 
2012; Meck & Ivry, in press; Tucci, Buhusi, Gallistel, & Meck, 2014; Vatakis & Allman, 2014; Vatakis, 
Esposito, Giagkou, Cummins, & Papadelis, 2011; Vatakis & Ulrich, 2014). Block and Grondin (2014) 
provide a helpful “review of recent reviews”, and an annotated bibliography is available online 
(Block & Hancock, 2013). Readers can also find reviews of how sex differences (Block, Hancock, & 
Zakay, 2000; Hancock & Rausch, 2010), developmental changes (Block, Zakay, & Hancock, 1999; 
Droit-Volet, 2012 Droit-Volet, 2012; Droit-Volet & Zélanti, 2013; McCormack, 2015), age and general 
intelligence (Bartholomew, Meck, & Cirulli, 2015), body temperature (Wearden & Penton-Voak, 
1995), emotions (Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009), and clinical conditions (e.g., Allman & Meck, 2012; Vatakis 
& Allman, 2015) influence human time perception.  
The current paper takes a different approach. Rather than surveying the rich theoretical 
accounts of timing, we focus on how the subjective experience of time is related to other aspects of 
4 
 
perception and cognition. Specifically, we describe how the apparent duration of a time interval is 
influenced by three key factors: the non-temporal perceptual properties of the sensory input (which 
we label ‘perception’, for convenience); the allocation of processing resources between different 
stimuli and tasks (attention); and the existence of previously-established mental representations 
(memory). Our motivation is twofold. First, because time perception is in some ways ‘special’, it is 
often studied and modelled in relative isolation from other processes and frameworks (Matthews & 
Meck, 2014). We hope that an integrated discussion of the links between subjective duration and 
other mental processes will encourage time perception researchers to explore links to new domains, 
and encourage researchers from other fields to identify the contribution that their work might make 
to time perception research. Second, we hope to show that diverse results from studies of 
perception, attention, and memory can be integrated within a unifying framework which provides a 
basis for further theoretical development and empirical work. Our over-arching aim is to encourage 
cross-disciplinary thinking and to highlight research directions that will contribute to the 
development of unified theoretical accounts, as presaged by Macar, Pouthas, and Friedman (1992) 
and Teki, Grube, & Griffiths (2012).  
Our focus is on subjective duration – the perception or judgment of the temporal extent of a 
stimulus or event. As such, we do not consider other aspects of time perception such as the 
existence or nature of a “perceptual moment”, a psychological “now” that quantizes perceptual 
experience and that is normally investigated by having people making judgments of simultaneity or 
temporal order (e.g., Allport, 1968; Stroud, 1955 Shallice, 1964; Poppel, 2009; Kristofferson, 1980; 
Matthews & Grondin, 2012). Similarly, we do not consider motor timing or rhythm perception, 
which commonly treated as distinct from duration judgments (Buonomano & Laje, 2010; Coull & 
Nobre, 2008; Mauk & Bounomano, 2004; Merchant, Zarco, Pérez, Prado, & Bartolo, 2011; but see 
e.g., Ivry & Hazeltine, 1995). 
We focus on the judgment of intervals in the range of a few hundred milliseconds to a few 
seconds, because these are the most commonly-studied intervals in research on human time 
perception. Perhaps more importantly, this duration range is the one most widely used in non-
temporal studies of perception and cognition, making these intervals most relevant to our goal of 
encouraging cross-disciplinary integration. It is unclear whether timing over this range rests on a 
unitary system (e.g., Lewis & Miall, 2009; Merchant, Zarco, & Prado, 2008; Rammsayer & Troche, 
2014; Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2005), or whether distinct processes govern the timing of specific sets of 
durations, such as those below/above one second (e.g., Buonomano, Bramen, & Khodadadifar, 
2009; Lewis & Miall, 2003; Rammsayer & Lima, 1991). The finding that non-temporal manipulations 
exert differential effects on shorter/longer intervals has been taken to support a multiple-process 
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account (e.g., Rammsayer, 1999), so we note cases where the effects that we discuss vary as a 
function of physical duration. 
In Section 1, we introduce some of the key methods and findings of time perception 
research, and outline an information-processing framework that will help to structure our 
subsequent discussion. Sections 2, 3, and 4 discuss how subjective time is influenced by non-
temporal perception, attention, and memory, respectively. Finally, Section 5 concludes by discussing 
some implications of the links between subjective time and other mental processes. 
Given the breadth of topics under review, our treatment is necessarily somewhat selective. 
It is not possible to describe or reference every relevant study, but our coverage is based on 
extensive literature searches and discussion with other researchers (not limited to our 
collaborators). We have tried as far as possible to describe representative experiments, giving 
sufficient information about the methods and findings to allow a non-expert to understand what 
was done and what was found in studies of each type, and we indicate when other studies conflict 
with a particular finding or body of work. We have also sought as far as possible to be up-to-date in 
our coverage, describing recent studies that provide new theoretical insights as well as those which 
replicate long-established effects.  
 
Section 1: Studying Subjective Duration 
In this section we introduce some of the key methods and findings from studies of human 
temporal judgment so that the tasks and results of subsequent sections may be more easily 
understood by a broad range of investigators.   
 
Experimental Methods 
Prospective and retrospective judgments. Studies of temporal perception and judgment are 
divided into those in which the participant knows in advance that a temporal judgment will be 
required (prospective timing) and those in which the request for a time judgment comes 
unexpectedly after the stimulus or activity has finished (retrospective timing). Retrospective studies 
measure ‘remembered duration’ and usually involve estimating the duration of a task or stimulus-
sequence that lasts tens or hundreds of seconds, with a single trial per participant; they are 
therefore relatively rare (Block & Zakay, 1997), and judgments seem to be based on retrieval of the 
events that took place during the interval (Block, 2003; Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010; Poynter, 
1983; 1989). Our focus is on prospective judgments, which tap ‘experienced duration’ (Block & 
Zakay, 1997) and are influenced by the perceptual, attentional, and memory processes that are the 
emphasis of this review.  
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Most prospective studies concern intervals of a few hundred to a few thousand milliseconds. 
The to-be-timed interval is usually demarcated either by the continuous presentation of a stimulus 
(e.g., a pure tone or a photograph of a face) or by two very brief ‘marker’ stimuli with a blank 
interval in between them (e.g., two 10-ms clicks separated by 1 second); sometimes the interval 
contains several different stimuli (e.g., a sequence of tones or images), in which case the participant 
is asked to time the interval between first onset and final offset. Human participants may use 
counting or other rhythmic activity to assist their judgments. Such strategies become useful for 
intervals longer than about 1-2 seconds (Grondin et al., 1999; Grondin, Ouellet, & Roussel, 2004), 
and a simple exhortation not to count is an effective way to avoid these complications (Rattat & 
Droit-Volet, 2011). 
Psychophysical tools. Many studies of subjective duration use conventional psychophysical 
tasks, but researchers also employ methods that are rarely seen in other fields. In conventional 
studies, the researcher presents two time intervals on each trial: a standard, whose duration is fixed 
across trials, and a comparison, whose duration varies. The participant indicates which interval was 
longer (or shorter), and these responses are used to estimate a psychophysical function – e.g., a 
Weibull, logistic, or cumulative-normal curve relating the size of the comparison interval to the 
probability that it will be judged longer than the standard. The slope of the curve provides a measure 
of the variability of temporal representations (flatter = noisier), and the comparison duration which 
is equally likely to be judged shorter or longer than the standard gives the point of subjective 
equality (PSE). The PSE indicates how long the comparison stimulus must be to have the same 
apparent duration as the standard: lower PSEs imply that the subjective experience of the 
comparison is longer, because it only has to be presented for a short time to seem as long as the 
standard.  
Researchers also use a single interval paradigm in which just one stimulus is presented on 
each trial and observers classify it as ‘short’ or ‘long’ (e.g., Grondin, 2010; Kristofferson, 1980), on 
the basis that people rapidly develop an implicit standard based on the set of stimuli encountered 
during the session (Morgan, Watamaniuk, & McKee, 2000). Other single-interval tasks require the 
participant to identify which of several previously-presented intervals has been presented (absolute 
identification), to classify each stimulus on, say, a 7-point scale ranging from ‘very short’ to ‘very 
long’ (category judgment), or to provide a numerical estimate of the duration of the stimulus in 
seconds or milliseconds (verbal estimation). In these tasks, the mean judgment assigned to a given 
stimulus provides a measure of its apparent duration. 
Temporal production/reproduction. Time-perception researchers also use magnitude 
production tasks that are relatively rare in other fields. In these tasks, experimenters ask participants 
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to produce a given time interval, either by holding down a button for a target duration, by making 
two responses that are separated by the target duration, or by making a response to terminate the 
presentation of a stimulus once a target duration has been reached (Mioni, Stablum, McClintock, & 
Grondin, 2014). In temporal production tasks, the target interval is verbally-defined (e.g., “2 
seconds”); in temporal reproduction tasks a particular duration is presented at the start of the trial 
participants have to produce an interval of the same extent.  
It is worth clarifying what different production responses imply about subjective duration. 
Consider first a reproduction task in which the experimenter varies the non-temporal properties of 
the standard interval presented at the start of the trial. A manipulation that expands subjective 
duration would make the standard seem to last longer, and would lead to longer productions in the 
second part of the trial. Now consider a variable that is manipulated during the production interval 
itself. A condition that increases subjective time would mean that the target interval seems to be 
reached more quickly, leading to a shorter production response than usual. Thus, whether we take a 
shorter produced duration to indicate an increase or decrease in subjective duration depends on 
whether the factor of interest was manipulated during the standard- or production-interval stage of 
the task.  
Production tasks are widely used, but it can be hard to separate the contribution of 
perceptual and motor components (Droit-Volet, 2010), and people may choose to prolong a 
production/reproduction for reasons that are nothing to do with their representation of duration – 
for example, you might leave an exciting image on-screen for longer than a boring one simply 
because you enjoy looking at it. 
Animal learning paradigms. Finally, time perception researchers have imported methods 
from studies of animal learning/conditioning. In temporal generalization, the observer is first given 
several presentations of a standard duration followed by a series of test durations centred on the 
standard, to which they must respond ‘same’ or ‘different’ (e.g., Wearden, 1992). The proportion of 
‘same’ responses for each test stimulus is used to construct a generalization gradient whose width 
indexes temporal precision and whose peak location indicates accuracy (e.g., Church & Gibbon, 
1982). In temporal bisection, the participant is first given multiple exposures to ‘short’ and ‘long’ 
anchor durations, followed by a test phase in which they judge a set of intermediate durations as 
being closer to the ‘short’ or ‘long’ standard (e.g., Droit-Volet, Brunot, & Neidenthal, 2004; Penney, 
Gibbon, & Meck, 2008). These procedures are unusual in asking participants to ‘learn’ the standard 
stimuli at the start of the session, but in other respects they are similar to the conventional 
psychophysical tasks described above and use the same curve-fitting analysis to estimate of the 




The scalar property 
The most widely-discussed findings in time-perception research concern the variability of 
temporal judgments. Time, like length or loudness, is a prothetic dimension, meaning that sensory 
analysis consists of establishing the quantity rather than the quality of the stimulation (Stevens, 
1957). Like other prothetic dimensions, the just noticeable difference between two times is often a 
fixed proportion of the reference level (Weber’s law), such that the standard deviation of a temporal 
representation is typically a linear function of its mean. More than this, the distribution functions for 
temporal judgments are scale invariant, meaning that their statistical properties remain the same at 
different measurement scales.  
Figure 1 plots two illustrative examples. The top row shows data from a temporal 
generalization experiment in which participants indicated whether various comparison tones 
matched the duration of a standard (Wearden, Denovan, Fakhri, & Haworth, 1997). As the standard 
increases from 2 to 8 seconds, the generalization gradients become more diffuse, but when the data 
are normalized by dividing the comparison durations by the standard for that block, the curves 
superimpose (second panel). That is, the generalization gradients are time-scale invariant. Likewise, 
the bottom row shows data from a bisection task in which participants classified intermediate 
durations as closer to ‘short’ or ‘long’ anchors learned at the start of the session (Allan & Gibbon, 
1991). Each line represents performance with a different pair of anchors; when the stimulus 
durations are normalized by the bisection point for each curve (right panel), the lines again show 
good superimposition (with some deviation for the very longest pair of anchors).  
This kind of scalar timing has been found in many studies of children, adults, and non-human 
animals using a range of psychophysical and conditioning tasks (e.g., Brannon, Libertus, Meck, & 
Woldorff, 2008; Buhusi et al., 2009; Droit-Volet, 2002; Gibbon, 1977; Gibbon, Malapani, Dale & 
Gallistel, 1997; Melgire et al., 2005; Wearden, 1992). Correspondingly, conditions or participant 
groups which violate scalar timing therefore attract theoretical attention (e.g., Allman & Meck, 2012; 
Grondin, 2012, 2014; Gu, Jurkowski, Lake, Malapani, & Meck, 2015; Kristofferson, 1980; Lejeune & 
Wearden, 2006; Penney, Meck, Roberts, Gibbon, & Erlenmeyer, 2005; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008). 
The scalar property is regarded as a central explicandum of time perception (Buhusi & 
Oprisan, 2013; Hass & Durstewitz, 2014; Oprisan & Buhusi, 2014; Simen, Rivest, Ludvig, Balci, & 
Killeen, 2013), and virtually all formal models assume or seek to explain the effect. This is largely 
because the scalar property constrains the processes by which a mental representation of physical 
time might be formed. A common way to think about timing is in terms of some kind of counting or 
accumulation process, and many formal models posit a dedicated internal pacemaker whose 
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accumulated pulses form the raw material of subjective time (Figure 4, left panel). For such models, 
scale invariance provides important constraints on the distribution of pulses. Gibbon’s (1977) Scalar 
Expectancy Theory, for example, makes the neurally-plausible assumption of independent pulses 
with exponentially-distributed inter-arrival times. However, pulse accumulation is then a Poisson 
process, meaning that the coefficient of variation (SD/M) grows with the square-root of the mean, 
contradicting the scalar property and necessitating alternative assumptions about the counting 
process (e.g., Gibbon, 1992; Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 1963; Simen et al., 2013). Indeed, some 
researchers have rejected counting as the basis for scalar timing altogether, and have developed 
models based on, inter alia, the detection of co-incident patterns of activity in neural oscillators 
(Matell & Meck, 2000, 2004; Oprisan & Buhusi, 2014), the neural dynamics of recurrent networks 
(e.g., Goel & Buonomano, 2014), the random switching of bistable units between states (Almeida & 
Ledberg, 2010), or the continuous monitoring of inflow-outflow systems (Wackermann & Ehm, 
2006).  
The scale invariance of temporal judgements is part of a general pattern of many perceptual 
and mnemonic processes (Bjork & Whitten, 1974; Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Moreton & Ward, 
2010; Stewart, Brown, & Chater, 2005). Indeed, scale invariance has been proposed as a unifying 
psychological principle that manifests itself in a number of psychophysical ‘laws’, including the 
Weber and Stevens laws for perceptual discrimination/estimation, the power law of forgetting, Fitts’ 
law relating movement times to the size and distance of the target, and Pieron’s law relating 
detection reaction-times to stimulus intensity (see Chater & Brown, 1999). This ubiquity may 
originate from the statistical structure of the environment, where scale invariant power-law 
relations are widespread (Chater & Brown, 1999; Anderson & Schooler, 1991). In any case, the scalar 
property can be seen as a commonality between time judgments and other cognitive processes, 
which is encouraging for the development of integrated accounts. Similarly, time judgments show a 
range of task, context, and order effects which are found for a wide range of perceptual and non-
perceptual continua (e.g., Bausenhart, Dyjas, & Ulrich, 2014; Brown, McCormack, Smith, & Stewart, 
2005; Dyjas & Ulrich, 2014; Hellström, 2003; Matthews & Stewart, 2009a, 2009b; Penney, Brown, & 
Wong, 2014) and which have successfully been modelled by over-arching theoretical frameworks 
(e.g., Brown, McCormack, Smith, & Stewart, 2005; DeCorte & Matell, 2015; Dyjas, Bausenhart, & 
Ulrich, 2012; Hellström, 1979; Gu & Meck, 2011; Jazayeri & Shadlen, 2010; Parducci, 1965; Shi, 
Church, & Meck, 2013; Wearden & Ferrara, 1995). 
 
Introducing the Processing Principle 
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This review focuses on the ways in which many non-temporal variables affect subjective 
time. We survey the various ‘temporal illusions’ (Eagleman, 2008) in which apparent duration is 
influenced by basic physical properties, attentional processes, and prior experience with the 
stimulus. These three topics have been selectively reviewed in the past (Eagleman & Pariyadath, 
2009), but an integrated account of the literature, both within and across these domains, is lacking. 
Previous discussions covering ‘non-temporal’ perceptual variables have largely focused on stimulus 
magnitude (e.g., Bueti & Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003) but, as we shall see, many other factors also 
affect apparent duration. Likewise, several reviews have described the links between time 
perception and ‘attention’, but have focussed on the division of mental effort between a timing task 
and a separate, non-temporal task – that is, on the importance of ‘attending to time’ (e.g., Block, 
2003; Block & Gruber, 2014; Block, Hancock, & Zakay, 2010; S.W. Brown, 2008; Grondin, 2010). We 
cover this work, but also review broader findings on the effects of directing attention to a stimulus – 
whether endogenously or exogenously, and on the basis of spatial, temporal, or featural cues. And 
while there have been useful reviews/discussions of ‘time perception and memory’ (e.g., Block & 
Zakay, 2008; Block & Gruber, 2014), these have dealt with the question of how memory of a 
stimulus or activity is used to construct a retrospective duration judgment (often using quite long 
time intervals); studies of how the perceived duration of a presented stimulus varies as a function of 
whether it has previously been encoded have not been brought together, despite extensive 
empirical investigation of the roles of sensory, short-term, and long-term memory of subjective 
time. Finally, while there have been attempts at wider-ranging reviews that summarize results from 
multiple domains, these have been self-described as brief or selective, and/or relate to a single 
theoretical position (e.g., Gorea, 2011; Grondin, 2010; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2009). 
The current review therefore seeks to collate and integrate a wide range of findings from 
different domains. As we will show, subjective duration is highly labile and shaped by many non-
temporal variables. Our primary aim in reviewing these effects is to highlight the deep connections 
between the experience of time and other perceptuo-cognitive processes, in the hope that this will 
stimulate cross-disciplinary empirical work and theoretical integration. Rather than simply 
cataloguing the multitude of behavioural effects, we will seek to show that many of the findings fall 
under a broad, unifying principle, which we call the processing principle. This is the generalization 
that the subjective duration of a stimulus is positively related to the strength of its perceptual 
representation -- the experienced vividness and clarity of the percept, and the ease with which 
information can be extracted from this representation; correspondingly, the conditions that 
facilitate perceptual decisions also expand the apparent duration of the stimulus. That is, the 
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processes and variables that make a percept subjectively more vivid and objectively easier to 
identify, categorize, and evaluate also make it seem to last longer.  
This theoretical perspective is illustrated in Figure 2; the sketch is intentionally crude, 
emphasizing the key features of the framework without commitment to specific cognitive or neural 
accounts of perception. As depicted in the figure, the formation of a percept depends on the 
confluence of incoming sensory information, the allocation of processing resources, and the 
existence of prior representations. The overall strength of a percept is modulated by stimulus 
variables that increase or decrease the input signal, by the intentional or automatic deployment of 
attention, and by changes to the sensitivity and efficiency of the system resulting from recent or 
distant past experience with the same inputs. These factors combine to produce a representation 
that supports processes such as identification, categorization, and the selection of an appropriate 
action – outputs which can be grouped under the heading ‘perceptual decisions’ (e.g., Ratcliff & 
Smith, 2004).  
For ‘bottom up’ variables (i.e., stimulus properties that shape non-temporal perception), the 
key issue will be the effective strength of the input signal. This will depend both on the absolute 
sensory properties of the stimulus itself and on its relationship to the context established by the 
immediate background and other, recently-encountered items. ‘Top down’ attention will serve to 
modulate the sensory input, boosting the effective perceptual strength of some representations at 
the expense of others on the basis of spatial, temporal, or feature-based expectations or relevance. 
Finally, pre-existing stimulus representations (i.e., memory) will also modulate the processing of the 
stimulus to facilitate or impair information-extraction from a given percept. All of these processes 
shape the overall strength of the percept and ease of information processing; and, in general, they 
produce corresponding shifts in apparent duration. 
It is important to be clear about what the processing principle is, and what it is not. First, it is 
not (yet) a formal ‘model of time perception’; rather, it is an empirical generalization, an abstraction 
that holds across a diverse body of work examining the links between subjective time and 
perception, attention, and memory, described in this review. Some of these effects have long been 
known, but their overarching similarity in terms of perceptual vividity and information-extractions 
has not previously been highlighted. Second, the processing principle is not a basis for precise 
quantitative predictions; however, it does suggest useful directions for future research which would 
contribute towards a more unified account of temporal cognition, and we describe these as we go, 
whilst also acknowledging situations where the principle does not provide such a useful framework. 
Finally, the processing principle is not a claim about the specific mechanism by which psychological 
time is represented or judged. However, it does inform and constrain theories of timing, and speaks 
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to recent theoretical developments which could integrate time perception with more general 
models of cognition. We survey some of these in the final section of the review. 
According to the processing principle, the conditions that facilitate perceptual decisions also 
expand the apparent duration of the stimulus. That is, the processes and variables that make a 
percept subjectively more vivid and objectively easier to identify and categorize also make it seem to 
last longer. The remaining sections of this paper describe the connections between subjective 
duration and non-temporal perception, attention, and memory, and will illustrate how the 
processing principle provides a useful generalization in each case – as well as noting results which 
seem to call for an alternative analysis. Irrespective of the utility of the processing principle as a way 
to conceptualize time perception, the findings that we review – and the commonalities that cut 
across research areas – mean that subjective time constitutes an important topic for cognitive 
scientists. 
 
Section 2. Subjective Time and Non-Temporal Properties 
In this section we describe how basic non-temporal properties of the stimulus affect its 
apparent duration, and discuss over-arching theoretical explanations for these effects. Just as for all 
perceptual judgments, we can never be sure whether a given variable really affects subjective 
experience rather than the participant’s response strategy – although attempts at disentangling 
these possibilities are noted below – but in general we will follow widespread practice and use 
‘judged duration’, ‘apparent duration’, and ‘subjective duration’ interchangeably, here and 
throughout the paper. Most of the effects that we describe have been tested in a wide variety of 
judgment tasks and using observers who are motivated to be accurate; thus, they are not readily 
dismissed as simple response strategies. 
Magnitude Effects. Apparent duration is usually a positive function of the intensity of the 
sensory signal (Figure 3). Perhaps the most basic example is the finding is that a ‘filled interval’ (e.g., 
a continuous tone) is typically judged to be longer than an empty one (e.g., a silent interval 
demarcated by two brief clicks)). The situation is more complex when longer intervals are used and 
filled with complicated tasks like card sorting, where the division of attention between the timing 
and non-timing task are presumed to be important (see Section 3, below). Nonetheless, the filled-
interval illusion is a robust feature of prospective timing for stimuli in the milliseconds-to-seconds 
range and holds across modalities, ages, and designs (e.g., Droit-Volet, 2008; Plourde, Gamache, & 
Grondin, 2008; Wearden, Norton, Martin, & Montford-Bebb, 2007), although it may disappear for 
very short or very long intervals (Droit-Volet, 2008; Hasuo, Nakajima, & Ueda, 2011) and be 
somewhat species-specific (Miki & Santi, 2005). 
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More generally, the subjective duration of a given interval positively correlates with the 
magnitude of the stimulus. For example, Goldstone, Lhamon, and Sechzer (1978) used a red light 
emitting diode to define a standard interval of 1 second followed by a variable comparison interval, 
and had participants judge which was longer using a 5-point response scale.  The comparison 
stimulus was judged longer when it was bright and the standard was dim (0.8 and 14.0 cd/m2, 
respectively) than when the brightnesses were reversed. Thus, higher intensity illumination 
increased subjective duration. Goldstone et al. found the same when they varied the loudness of 
pure tone auditory stimuli. These intensity effects have been replicated using a variety of different 
tasks (Berglund, Berglund, Ekman, & Frankenhaeuser, 1969; Goldstone & Goldfarb, 1964; Matthews 
et al, 2011; Zelkind, 1973) and generalize to other modalities: Ekman and colleagues found that 
subjective duration increased as a logarithmic function of the intensity of both electrical and 
vibrotactile stimulation of the skin (Ekman, Frankenhaeuser , Berglund, & Waszak, 1969; Ekman, 
Frankenhaeuser, Levander, and Mellis, 1966). Recently, Lu, Mo, and Hodges (2011) found that 
heavier weights were judged to last longer than lighter ones in the kilogram range (but not in the 
gram range, where the intensity differences were presumed to be irrelevant).  
These intensity effects can be seen as part of a general principle that subjective duration is 
positively related to non-temporal magnitude. In one influential study, Xuan, Zhang, He, & Chen 
(2007) presented pairs of visual stimuli differing in duration by a factor of 1.25 (e.g., 600 and 750 
ms), and had participants indicate which had longer duration. Accuracy was higher when the brief 
stimulus was dim and the longer stimulus was bright – a congruency effect that replicates the finding 
that more intense stimuli are judged to last longer. More importantly, Xuan et al. (2007) found the 
same congruency effect for other magnitudes: empty squares with larger area were judged to last 
longer than ones with smaller area; arrays consisting of 8 or 9 dots were judged to last longer than 
those comprising just 1 or 2, and, higher-valued digits (8 and 9) were judged to last longer than 
smaller ones (1 or 2). Similar effects of size and numerosity had been described in earlier studies 
using different methodologies (e.g., Dormal, Seron, & Pesenti, 2006; Thomas & Cantor, 1975), 
although a recent temporal reproduction study found that the numerosity effect only occurred for 
males (Hayashi, Valli, & Carlson, 2013), and Agrillo, Ranpura, and Butterworth (2010) found no effect 
of numerosity on judgments of duration for tone sequences, albeit using longer intervals (5-13 
seconds) than the range we focus on. 
Two conceptual issues arise in connection with this work. The first concerns the locus of the 
effect: does the influence of non-temporal magnitude represent a ‘genuine’ perceptual confusion or 
a response strategy? Large objects digits may stimulate ‘longer’ responses by virtue of overlapping 
semantic representations, for example, without actually ‘seeming’ any longer. Yates, Loestscher, and 
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Nicholls (2012) found that a conventional comparative judgment task (“which square was presented 
for longer?”) replicated the familiar finding that larger squares were judged to last longer than 
smaller ones. However, when participants had to classify the durations as ‘same’ or ‘different’, the 
point of subjective equality showed that smaller squares were judged to last longer than large ones. 
The authors took this to indicate that spatial size biases responses rather than distorting perception. 
However, recent computational modelling has shown that equality judgments are not well-suited to 
distinguishing between perceptual and decisional effects (Birngruber, Shröter, & Ulrich, 2014). In 
addition, researchers have found that visual size and digit magnitude positively affect responses in 
temporal reproduction tasks, which are thought to avoid the stimulus-response compatibility and 
decision-strategy effects that might contaminate comparative judgments (Chang, Tzeng, Hung, & 
Wu, 2011; Rammsayer & Verner, 2014).  
A second key point is that subjective duration is influenced by relative, not absolute, 
stimulus magnitude. Against a high-intensity background it is quiet sounds and dim lights that are 
judged longer than loud/bright ones (Matthews, Stewart, & Wearden, 2011). Likewise, a medium-
sized circle both looks bigger and is judged to last longer when surrounded by small circles than 
when surrounded by large ones, despite the physical magnitude remaining unchanged (Ono & 
Kawahara, 2007). Similarly, a large shape is only judged to last longer than a small one when the 
participant sees both in the same session and can explicitly compare their sizes (Gomez & 
Robertson, 1979); a recent study also found no effect of digit magnitude when small and large 
numeric values were presented in separate blocks, but obtained the usual ‘larger=longer’ result 
when they were intermingled (Vicario, 2011). Indeed, digit effects were enhanced by adding the 
suffix ‘kilograms’ and reduced by adding ‘grams’ (Lu, Hodges, Zhang, & Zhang, 2009), indicating a 
pronounced contextual-dependency for the influence of numeric magnitude. 
Magnitude effects have generated interest because they relate to the proposal, discussed 
below, that there may be a generalized ‘magnitude representation’ system that encompasses time, 
space, and number (Walsh, 2003; see also Cordes, Williams, & Meck, 2007). The finding that numeric 
magnitude influences duration judgments has generated a particularly large volume of empirical 
work, partly because of the theoretical interest in origins and mechanisms of numerical cognition 
(e.g., Buhusi & Cordes, 2011; Carey, 2009; Haun, Jordan, Vallortigara, & Clayton, 2010; Lustig, 2011), 
and researchers have investigated numerosity and digit effects on time perception in people with 
dyscalculia (e.g., Cappelletti, Freeman, & Butterworth, 2011), neuropsychological patients (e.g., 
Cappelletti, Freeman, & Cipolotti, 2011), and infants (e.g., Allman, Pelphrey, & Meck, 2012; Lourenco 
& Longo, 2010), as well as examining how training in number discrimination influences the effect of 
numerosity on subjective time (e.g., Javadi & Aichelburg, 2013). 
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Beyond magnitude. The ‘larger=longer’ idea has generated much interest, but other 
stimulus properties exhibit equally powerful effects on subjective duration. One of the most robust 
is sensory modality, with auditory stimuli typically judged longer than visual ones of the same 
duration. In a representative study, Goldstone and Goldfarb (1964) had participants judge the 
duration of pure tones or steady lights presented for 0.15-1.95 seconds. The lights were judged 
shorter than the tones, irrespective of whether judgments were on a 9-point ‘social scale’ (e.g., ‘very 
much less than one second’) or a ‘subjective’ scale (e.g., ‘very, very short’). Notably, each participant 
judged stimuli from a single modality, so the effect was not reliant on direct comparisons (Wearden, 
Todd, & Jones, 2006). This auditory-visual difference has been found repeatedly in children as well as 
young and older adults (e.g., Droit-Volet, Meck, & Penney, 2007; Goldstone & Lhamon, 1974; 
Harrington, Castillo, Fong, & Reed, 2011; Lustig & Meck, 2011; Penney, Gibbon, & Meck, 2000; 
Wearden, Edwards, Fakhri, & Percival, 1998). More recent work has found that vibrotactile stimuli 
are also judged shorter than tones and similarly to lights (Jones, Poliakoff, & Wells, 2009). 
Apparent duration is also influenced by a wide assortment of other stimulus variables, many 
of which relate to stimulus movement or change. Moving or flickering visual stimuli are typically 
judged to last longer than static ones (e.g., Brown, 1995; Kanai, Paffen, Hogendoorn, & Verstraten, 
2006; Lhamon & Goldstone, 1975). Among dynamic stimuli, faster motion/higher temporal 
frequencies expand subjective duration relative to lower rates of change, although the effect seems 
to saturate at high frequencies (e.g., Brown, 1995; Herbst, Javadi, van der Meer, & Busch, 2013; 
Kanai et al., 2006) and there is disagreement about whether the key factor is speed or temporal 
frequency (Kaneko & Murakami, 2009; Linares & Gorea, 2015). Subjective time is expanded for 
looming motion relative to receding motion (Ono & Kitazawa, 2010), and for point-light displays 
depicting biological motion relative to displays where the motion is scrambled (Wang & Jiang, 2012; 
see also Carrozzo, Moscatelli, & Lacquaniti, 2010). Of particular note, recent work in which moving 
stimuli were presented against moving backgrounds has established that subjective duration 
primarily depends on apparent rather than physical speed (Gorea & Kim, 2015), mirroring the 
relativity of the magnitude effects discussed above (see also Orgs, Bestmann, Schuur, & Haggard, 
2011). Likewise, subjective duration is shaped by the perceived speed of a composite pattern rather 
than by the speed of its components (Yamamoto & Miura, 2012).  
Recent work has also shown that, both in the auditory and visual modalities, stimuli that 
move or change at a constant rate are judged longer than those which accelerate or decelerate, and 
decelerating stimuli are typically judged longer than accelerating ones (Binetti, Lecce, & Doricchi, 
2012; Matthews, 2011b, 2013). More generally, however, the effects of regularity/complexity – both 
of static images and of dynamic stimulus sequences – have been mixed (e.g., Aubry, Giullaume, 
16 
 
Mogicato, Bergeret, & Celsis, 2008; Folta-Schoofs, Wolf, Treue, & Schoofs, 2014; Hogan, 1975; Horr 
& Di Luca, 2015; Palumbo, Ogden, Makin, & Bertamini, 2014; Schiffman & Bobko, 1974), perhaps 
because of differing complexity-metrics, judgment tasks, and duration-ranges. 
Finally, a collection of other modality-specific perceptual properties influence timing. As 
examples: for auditory stimuli, higher-pitched tones and speech-sounds seem to be judged longer 
than lower ones (Brigner, 1988; Cohen, Hansel, & Sylvester, 1954; Yu, 2010; but see Goldstone & 
Goldfarb, 1964, for a null result). For visual stimuli, recent work suggests that red stimuli are judged 
to last longer than blue ones (Shibasaki & Masataka, 2014), that static images with implied motion 
seem longer than those without implied movement (Yamamoto & Miura, 2012), and that Gabor 
patches with mid-range spatial-frequencies (2 cycles per degree) are judged longer than low (0.5 
cycles/degree) or high (8 cycles/degree) frequency stimuli (Aaen-Stockdale, Hotchkiss, Heron, & 
Whitaker, 2011).  
In addition to these heterogeneous effects, time judgments are often affected by ‘higher 
level’ variables including emotional significance and familiarity. We discuss such effects in the 
‘Attention’ and ‘Memory’ sections below. 
 
Theoretical Accounts 
Several theories seek to explain the distorting effects of non-temporal stimulus features on 
subjective duration. Here we describe the three principle suggestions before outlining an account 
that seeks to unify the research findings. 
 
Internal-clock models. Several theorists have used the pacemaker-accumulator framework 
to account for the effects of non-temporal dimensions on subjective time. At the onset of timing, a 
switch closes and pulses from an internal pacemaker flow into an accumulator; at the end of the 
timed interval the switch opens and the flow of pulses ends; the accumulated pulses form the 
representation of duration and the current value is compared against values stored in long-term 
memory to form a decision – for example, about whether a response will be rewarded (Figure 4, left 
panel).  
In this framework, the non-temporal properties of the stimulus might influence the latency 
to close or open the switch, producing a constant increase or decrease in its judged duration. 
Alternatively, the rate of the pacemaker may increase, in which case the effect will become more 
pronounced as the duration of the stimulus is increased (a ‘slope effect’). Wearden et al. (1998) 
applied this logic to the difference between auditory and visual stimuli by having participants make 
verbal estimates of tones and lights varying from 77 to 1183 ms. They found a clear slope effect: the 
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expanded subjective duration of the tone stimuli became more pronounced at longer durations, 
consistent with a pacemaker increase. Penney et al. (2000) likewise argued that auditory signals 
accelerate the pacemaker, although they suggested that this might be because auditory signals are 
better at holding attention and therefore at keeping the switch closed throughout stimulus 
presentation.  
The effects of non-temporal properties illustrated in Figure 3 all provide examples of slope 
effects, consistent with an increased rate of accumulation. Importantly, irrespective of whether one 
adopts a ‘clock’ framework, these data show that changes in subjective duration are not merely a 
consequence of changes in onset/offset detection; the same applies to many of the other stimulus 
and observer variables that we discuss throughout this paper: perception, attention, and memory 
affect the growth of subjective time, not just the latency to begin/end the timing process, although 
there are some manipulations that produce a fixed ‘intercept effect’ (e.g., Grommet et al., 2011; 
Jones & Ogden, 2015;  Matthews, 2011a, 2011c). 
Within the pacemaker framework, some researchers have suggested that non-temporal 
properties affect the memory- or decision-stage of the internal clock model. Cai and Wang (2014) 
had participants encode a target duration and then reproduce it with a sustained button press. 
When the target was defined by a digit and the reproduction interval by a green dot, the magnitude 
of the digit positively affected reproductions. However, when the stimulus order was reversed such 
that the target was defined by the dot and the reproduction interval by the number, there was no 
effect of digit magnitude. This argues against a pacemaker (or switch) account, which predicts an 
effect whenever a stimulus is timed. Cai and Wang suggest that numeric magnitude biases the 
decision process when “a digit has the opportunity to co-exist in memory with a perceived duration 
and to bias the noisy magnitude representation of the duration” (p. 8) – although it is unclear why 
this wouldn’t also apply to the on-going stimulus presented during the reproduction interval. Indeed, 
Chang et al. (2011) did find an effect of digit size for both the target and reproduced durations, 
arguing against the data and theory of Cai and Wang (2014); Chang et al.’s effect was independent of 
physical duration, suggesting a switch effect rather than a pacemaker-rate increase.  
The pacemaker-accumulator framework has helped researchers interpret the effects of 
changes in physical duration and stimulus order. These manipulations have not been applied to 
many of the dimensions discussed above, but it is already clear that the results are likely to be 
heterogeneous. More importantly, a major limitation of the pacemaker framework is that makes no 
predictions (and offers no explanation) regarding which dimensions will affect subjective duration, 
or of the direction of these effects.  
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A common magnitude system. Walsh (2003; Bueti & Walsh, 2009;) has proposed that time, 
space, and quantity are represented in a common ‘magnitude system’ located in the brain’s parietal 
cortex (see also Aagten-Murphy, Iversen, Williams, & Meck, 2014; Dallal, Yin, Nekovářová, Stuchlík, 
& Meck, 2015). Under this view, the influence of numerosity, length, or digit-size on temporal 
judgments arises because these dimensions share a unified metric – the implication being that the 
measurement of any one of these dimensions involves measuring the others so that the 
measurement of duration, for example, is partly based on the measurement of number, spatial 
extent, numerosity, and so on (Figure 4, top right). This idea can be seen as a particular, 
neuroanatomically-specific version of the idea that intensity/magnitude on one dimension 
influences perceived intensity on other dimensions. 
 In support of this common-metric framework, non-temporal magnitudes interfere with one 
another as well as with judgments of time. For example, Dormal and Pesenti (2007) found 
facilitation of numerosity comparisons when number and spatial length were congruent (that is, 
when the more numerous set of dots were also spread out in a longer spatial array); Hurewitz, 
Gelman, and Schnitzer (2006) reported that circle size interfered with judgments of numerosity; and 
Pinel, Piazza, Le Bihan, & Dehaene (2004) found overlapping neural substrates and behavioural 
interference between judgments of luminance and stimulus size. Furthermore, patients with 
damage to the parietal cortex often show deficits both in temporal processing and in spatial and 
numerical tasks, and neuroimaging studies have found overlapping activity in this area in tasks that 
require representations of time, number, and other magnitudes (see Bueti & Walsh, 2009, and 
Dormal & Pesenti, 2012, for reviews). For example, one recent study presented participants with 
pairs of dot patterns and had them discriminate their durations or numerosities (Hayashi et al., 
2013). fMRI revealed that both tasks activated a common network that included the intraparietal 
cortex (IPC); moreover, applying trans-cranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to the right IPC enhanced 
the effects of numerosity on a subsequent temporal reproduction task. 
There are, however, some limitations. Empirically, the finding that relative rather than 
absolute magnitudes affect subjective duration suggests that, if there is a ‘common magnitude 
system’, it cannot involve a ‘hard-wired’ mapping between particular magnitudes on different 
dimensions. Moreover, although there is interference between judgments of time, space, and 
number, the effects of non-temporal dimensions on subjective duration seem to be much stronger 
than the reverse. For example, Dormal and Pesenti (2013) presented pairs of dot-sequences that 
varied in the duration, numerosity, and distance (length) covered by the stimuli. Both length and 
numerosity interfered with time judgments, but duration had no effect on the discrimination of 
number or spatial extent. And the aforementioned finding that number and physical area may only 
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influence temporal reproductions during the encoding of the target interval is hard to reconcile with 
a genuinely ‘shared metric’, because such a metric would imply an unavoidable association of larger 
magnitudes with longer subjective duration during the unfolding reproduction interval, too. 
Perhaps more importantly, the common-metric framework has some theoretical limitations. 
First, it is unclear which dimensions are represented in the common system. Walsh (2003) originally 
emphasized number, space, and time, on the basis of their joint importance to actions, although 
other prothetic dimensions such as luminance and sound intensity have also been mentioned (Bueti 
& Walsh, 2009; Walsh, 2003) and many of the perceptual dimensions that affect subjective time 
cannot obviously be classified as ‘magnitudes’ at all (e.g., sensory modality, spatial frequency, and 
tone pitch are not prothetic continua). Moreover, it is not clear what the shared representation at 
the heart of the theory actually consists of: what does it mean, in terms of information processing, 
to talk of a ‘common metric’ for time, space, and quantity? Walsh’s (2003) framework does not offer 
a clear answer, although researchers working in the internal-clock paradigm have examined how a 
common accumulation mechanism might underlie the representation of time, number, and length 
(Aagten-Murphy et al., 2014; Droit-Volet, 2010a; Meck & Church, 1983).    
Coding efficiency. Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) have suggested that subjective duration 
depends on the efficiency of neural coding. Specifically, stimuli which evoke larger neural responses 
will be perceived to last longer (Figure 4, bottom right). This idea has primarily been applied to 
results concerning the effects of stimulus repetition on time perception, discussed below, but 
Eagleman and Pariyadath point out that many of the non-temporal features which expand apparent 
duration also evoke larger neural responses. For example, Roitman, Brannon, and Platt (2007) found 
that increasing the number of dots in a display produced a monotonic increase in the firing rate of 
neurons in the lateral intraparietal area of monkeys. 
The coding efficiency account has a number of advantages. First, it is not restricted to a 
particular type of non-temporal factor; all sorts of variables, not just ‘magnitude’, can affect the size 
of an evoked response. Indeed, the framework provides a way to predict which stimulus variables 
will affect subjective time, and in what direction, unlike the clock- and common-metric accounts. 
Second, the framework does not require a monotonic time expansion across changes in the non-
temporal variable. Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) point out that the effect of increasing visual 
flicker on subjective time saturates at about 8 Hz, and that there is a similar saturation in BOLD 
response to flicker in the striate cortex. Finally, we saw above that the same physical magnitude can 
evoke different subjective duration depending on how its perceived size is shaped by the local 
context (Ono & Kawahara, 2007). Murray, Boyaci, and Kersten (2006) found that stimuli that are 
perceived to be larger evoke more activity (a larger cortical area) in V1 even if the actual visual angle 
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is the same, so the coding-efficiency view may be able to accommodate the context-dependency of 
non-temporal effects on apparent duration.  
Despite its promise, there are limitations. First, researchers have not yet tested whether the 
subjective duration of a given stimulus on a particular trial is positively related to the size of the 
evoked response on that trial. Second, Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) emphasize the idea that 
coding efficiency reflects implicit predictions and subjective time, but, as we will see below, the 
available data argue against a simple link between predictability and apparent duration. Finally, and 
most importantly, the processing of a stimulus involves multiple pre-cortical and cortical neurons 
across multiple time-scales; as Eagleman and Pariyadath (2009) note, “we cannot currently 
determine which neural activity will be critical”; indeed, a given stimulus variable may increase the 
neural activity for some areas/timepoints and decrease it for others.  The richness of neural 
processing means that it may be futile to search for a simple, macroscopic neural basis for time 
perception. 
 
Non-temporal Perception and the Processing Principle 
We suggest that the effects of basic stimulus properties on subjective time can usefully be 
conceptualized as part of the broader processing principle that we outlined above. According to this 
principle, subjective time is positively related to perceptual clarity and ease of information-
extraction, such that conditions which favour vivid representations and efficient perceptual decision-
making also lead to longer perceived duration. Correspondingly, subjective time depends on the 
interplay between external stimulus properties and the internal allocation of processing resources 
and recruitment of existing mental representations.  
This perspective is like the common-magnitude approach in emphasizing the perceptual 
properties that will expand or contract subjective time but, like the coding-efficiency account, 
construes ‘magnitude’ effects as a part of a broader principle and makes no claim about the 
associations between different non-temporal dimensions. Also, unlike both the common-magnitude 
and coding-efficiency models, this framework is agnostic about the specific neural structures or 
responses that underlie the distorting effects of non-temporal perception on apparent duration.  
Which properties will increase subjective duration? Regarding the effects of basic stimulus 
properties, the processing principle implies that physical features which boost the strength of the 
percept will also expand apparent duration. Perceptual clarity is partly determined by the basic 
intensity of the input – a weak signal is less vivid and leads to poorer information-extraction – but 
the relational nature of perception means that the over-riding issue is the salience of the stimulus: 
the extent to which it represents a change or ‘stands out’ from the background context. In most 
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circumstances, stimuli which are louder, brighter, moving, moving faster, more numerous, and so 
on, represent a bigger change than those which are quieter, dimmer, static, slower-moving, or 
fewer. Salience therefore encompasses the effects both of magnitude and of other properties such 
as motion and acceleration. (Stimuli may also be salient because of ‘higher level’ properties such as 
emotional or behavioural significance; we discuss these effects in later sections.) 
 Salience also captures the modulating role of background context. We noted above that 
increasing the background intensity reverses the effects of brightness and loudness on apparent 
duration (Matthews et al., 2011), and that the same medium-size disc is judged shorter or longer in 
duration depending on whether it is surrounded by large or small circles (Ono & Kawhara, 2007). The 
relative intensity/size of the item is what determines its distinctiveness and, correspondingly, its 
apparent duration. Moreover, salience is also shaped by the other stimuli presented in the 
experiment, and by experience from the ‘real world’. For example, the apparent duration of a simple 
line stimulus is positively related to the difference between its orientation and that of recent lines 
(Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011).  Indeed, factors which expand 
apparent duration in the ‘typical’ experiment may reverse when the stimulus is rendered less salient 
by changing the statistical structure of the local environment. For example, Tse et al. (2004) reversed 
the usual finding that moving stimuli (e.g., expanding discs) seem to last longer than static ones by 
making the static items relatively rare (but see van Wassenhove et al., 2008). These effects relate to 
the broader role of prior experience in subjective time, which we discuss in Section 4. 
The subjectivity and context-dependency of salience mean that attempts to predict 
subjective duration from physical properties must take into account how those properties will be 
experienced by the observer. As one example, existing studies of tone-pitch effects have reported 
that high-pitched tones are judged to last longer than low ones (Brigner, 1988; Cohen et al., 1954; 
Yu, 2010), but all of these papers compared frequencies where higher-pitched stimuli will also sound 
louder than low ones (e.g., Moore, 2012). In other words, tone pitch may have been confounded 
with loudness-based subjective salience. Similarly, Aaen-Stockdale et al. (2011) have noted that the 
numerous studies in which “tones seem to last longer than lights” all used visual stimuli with low 
spatial frequencies; with mid-range spatial frequencies, the modality effect reverses. Moreover, the 
spatial-frequency effect itself may depend on the subjective salience of these stimuli, as shaped by 
experience with the visual world: The Fourier amplitude spectra for natural images typically have 
amplitude proportional to 1/spatial frequency (e.g., Field & Brady, 1997); concentrating energy at 
mid-range spatial frequencies represents a departure from ‘normal’ input, producing discomfort and 
even migraines/epileptic seizures (Fernandez & Wilkins, 2008; Wilkins et al., 1984). So it is quite 
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possible that the mid-range stimuli were especially salient, with a corresponding increase in 
apparent duration.  
Information extraction. Stimulus salience is a key determinant of information-processing, so 
one implication of the foregoing framework is that the stimulus properties which increase salience 
and enhance apparent duration will also facilitate the extraction of non-temporal information from 
the stimulus. This idea has not been directly tested by time perception researchers, but there are 
suggestive data. For example, brighter stimuli typically seem to last longer than dim ones, and 
increasing luminance improves digit recall and image recognition by enhancing the rate at which 
information is extracted from the display (Loftus, 1985; Loftus & Redruth, 1994). Similarly, visual 
stimuli are better detected and discriminated when presented more centrally in the visual field, and 
central presentation also produces longer subjective durations (Kliegl & Huckauf, 2014). And larger 
stimuli not only seem to ‘last longer’ but are preferentially processed in visual search (Proulx, 2010); 
this effect is driven by the contextually-determined perceived size rather than by physical size 
(Proulx & Green, 2010), just as for subjective duration. Likewise, movement, which produces a 
robust expansion of subjective duration, also enhances the identification of faces (e.g., Lander & 
Bruce, 2003), emotions (e.g., Krumhuber, Kappas, & Manstead, 2013), and scenes (e.g., Matthews, 
Benjamin & Osborne, 2007).  
Of course, there will be limits to, and conflicts between, these effects. A jet engine has 
tremendous auditory intensity but this is likely to impair rather than improve the processing of other 
stimulus properties – and making a visual stimulus progressively larger also shifts more of it away 
from the centre of the visual field. Nonetheless, the effects of basic stimulus properties on the 
efficiency of non-temporal information-extraction provides a potentially useful predictor of 
subjective duration.  
 
The relevance of subjective time to perception researchers 
The connections between subjective time and non-temporal perception have several 
interesting implications. First, the importance of salience and context to time perception means that 
researchers who have developed models of these effects in other domains – for example, the 
‘contrast’, ‘inhibition’, and ‘intepretational’ accounts reviewed by Todorović (2010) – may be able to 
apply or adapt them to a range of new phenomena: those relating to subjective time. Equally, these 
researchers could bolster their theoretical repertoire by importing models which have been 
developed in the time-perception literature (e.g., the recently-proposed Internal Reference Model of 
context effects; Dyjas, Bausenhart, & Ulrich, 2012). This scope for ‘cross-fertilization’ extends 
beyond context effects; the fact that perceptual clarity and information extraction are fundamental 
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to subjective time means that researchers who work on neural and information-processing accounts 
of perceptual representation/judgment have rich new pastures in which to apply their models, as we 
discuss in more detail in the General Discussion. 
Secondly, manipulating time perception may provide a novel way to manipulate – and hence 
to understand -- non-temporal perception. The processing principle means that increased vividity 
entails increased subjective duration. The converse may also be true: factors that expand apparent 
duration might enhance unrelated aspects of perceptual processing. For example, presenting an 
auditory stimulus can lengthen the apparent duration of a concurrent visual item (e.g., Walker & 
Scott, 1981); correspondingly, detection of a fixed-duration visual stimulus can be improved by 
increasing the duration of an accompanying tone “in a similar way as altering the (actual) duration of 
the visual stimulus” (de Haas, Cecere, Cullen, Driver, & Romei, 2013) – as if the expansion of 
apparent duration by the auditory stimulus serves to improve the effective processing time for the 
visual target. Similarly, looming auditory stimuli (which, as discussed above, increase apparent 
duration) improve visual orientation discrimination (Leo, Romei, Freeman, Ladavas, & Driver, 2011) 
and increase the apparent size and luminance of visual objects (Sutherland, Thut, & Romei, 2014). 
These recent results suggest that the processing principle may operate bidirectionally, with increases 
in subjective duration boosting perceptual salience and information-extraction. Future work could 
therefore examine (a) whether the processing changes reported in these studies are mediated by 
changes in apparent duration, and (b) whether the effects generalize, such that perception 
researchers can modulate the apparent magnitude, clarity, and distinctiveness of a stimulus by 
altering its apparent duration via manipulation of other factors known to influence subjective time 
(e.g., amphetamine administration, body temperature, or presentation of a brief click-train 
presented prior to the item; Lake & Meck, 2013; Penton-Voak et al., 1996; Wearden & Penton-Voak, 
1995). 
Finally, the intimate links between temporal and non-temporal perception suggest new 
directions for neuroscientific research. The neuroanatomical basis for timing has been extensively 
researched and discussed, with particular emphasis on the basal ganglia (especially fronto-striatal 
pathways) and the (pre) supplementary motor area (e.g., Casini & Vidal, 2011; Coull & Nobre, 12008; 
Hinton & Meck, 2004; Livesey, Wall, & Smith, 2007; Meck & Malapani, 2004; Meck, Penney, & 
Pouthas, 2008; Pouthas et al., 2005). Although there may be specialized ‘timing circuits’, the links 
between temporal and non-temporal perception suggest functional connectivity between these 
areas and the cortical (and sub-cortical) activity traditionally associated with processing non-
temporal properties – connectivity which has not been fully explored, and which provides potentially 
fertile ground for neuroscientists studying (non-time) perception. A bolder possibility is that the 
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timing networks themselves play a direct role in non-temporal perception; there is certainly 
emerging evidence that the activity of local cortical networks underlies some aspects of subjective 
time (Johnston, Arnold, & Nishida, 2006).  
 
Section summary 
Many basic stimulus properties affect subjective duration. These ‘bottom up’ factors can 
usefully be conceptualized as those which alter salience and, correspondingly, the clarity of the 
percept and the ease with which information can be extracted from the stimulus. Subjective 
duration typically expands with increases in the difference between the stimulus and its context, 
although the effects of prior experience and the non-linear mapping between physical inputs and 
perception mean that the relation between physical properties and experienced salience is 
sometimes hard to predict. In terms of subjective experience, apparent duration is positively related 
to perceptual vividity – the extent to which one feels that something has happened when the 
stimulus occurs – and this improved perceptual clarity corresponds to improvements in the 
efficiency of information processing and perceptual decision-making. 
The effects surveyed in this section provide one instantiation of the processing principle, but 
perceptual clarity and information extraction also depend on the allocation of processing resources 
and the existence of prior representations. We consider the roles of attention and memory in the 
next sections. 
 
Section 3. The allocation of processing resources: Subjective time and attention 
Attention involves directing limited resources to improve the processing of specific sensory inputs. 
Both the selective and resource-sharing aspects of attention have important links with temporal 
perception (e.g., Buhusi & Meck, 2009; Champagne & Fortin, 2008; Coull, Vidal, Nazarian, & Macar, 
2004; Lake & Meck, 2013; Lui, Penney, & Schirmer, 2011; Nobre & Coull, 2010; Viau-Quesnel, 
Gaudreault, Ouellet, & Fortin, 2014; see Gorea, 20121, for an interesting theoretical perspective. We 
first discuss work examining how the allocation of attention to a stimulus affects its apparent 




Attending to a stimulus improves its perceptual processing by increasing its share of limited 
processing capacity (see Chun, Golomb, & Turk-Browne, 2011, and Knudsen, 2007, for reviews and 
useful taxonomies). Attention can be directed by cues that indicate where, when, or in which 
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modality a stimulus will appear; these cues may evoke an intentional, endogenous shift in attention 
by virtue of their symbolic meaning (e.g., an arrow pointing to the location of a forthcoming target; 
Posner, 1980), or may trigger automatic, exogenous orienting to a particular time, place, or channel 
(e.g., a brief flash near to where the target will appear; Jonides, 1981). There are important 
differences between endogenous and exogenous attention, but both types improve not just the 
detection but also the perceptual clarity of the target stimulus, acting as a form of gain control that 
improves stimulus identification and discrimination (Carrasco, 2011; Chun et al., 2011; Hillyard, 
Vogel, & Luck, 1998). Stimuli may also be selected for preferential processing by virtue of their 
physical properties and behavioural relevance, again with improvements in perceptual processing 
(e.g., Anderson, Laurent, & Yantis, 2011; Corbetta & Shulman, 2002; Ruz & Lupiáñez, 2002; 
Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007).  
Time perception researchers have deployed many of the experimental paradigms that were 
developed to study the effects of attention on non-temporal perception. To anticipate: several lines 
of research show that subjective duration is expanded for stimuli that are the focus of attention. 
Endogenous cuing. Mattes and Ulrich (1998) had participants classify the duration of black 
dots as ‘short’, ‘medium’, or ‘long’. At the start of each trial, an arrow indicated whether the target 
would be on the left or right of fixation, with the validity of this cue varying between blocks of trials. 
The validity of the cue as was varied between blocks of trials, with participants instructed to direct 
their attention to the cued location. Subjective duration increased with the probability that the 
target would appear in the attended location; that is, attending to the location of the forthcoming 
stimulus increased its subjective duration. This effect generalized to a duration discrimination task, 
and was replicated by Enns, Brehaut, and Shore (1999) who established that the cuing effect 
diminished as the cue-target interval increased from 100 to 1600 ms, that it generalized judging the 
duration of a gap in an otherwise continuous light stimulus, and that it was not due to the faster 
onset-detection of stimuli at cued locations. 
The effect of endogenous cuing is not limited to spatial orienting. Mattes and Ulrich (1998) 
also had participants judge the duration of auditory (pure tone) and visual (illuminated LED) stimuli 
following pre-cues which signalled the modality of the forthcoming signal. Subjective duration 
increased proportional to the allocation of attention to the appropriate channel, an effect which 
generalized across durations (from tens to hundreds of milliseconds) and time-judgment tasks 
(category rating and paired-comparison). 
Exogenous spatial cuing. Subjective duration is also affected by involuntary shifts of 
attention. Yeshurun and Marom (2008) had participants compared the duration of two discs 
presented to the left or right of central fixation. One disk was preceded by a neutral cue -- a bar 
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above both possible target locations. The other disc was preceded by a spatial cue – a bar above one 
above just one of the two locations where the disk could appear. This cue was uninformative (the 
target was equally likely to appear in the cued and uncued locations). Nonetheless, when the disk 
appeared in the cued location its subjective duration was expanded relative to the neutrally-cued 
disk, showing that involuntary orienting of spatial attention expands the subjective duration of 
stimuli at the attended location.   
Yeshurun and Marom (2008) found this effect only for brief durations (c. 100 ms) and Chen 
and O’Neill (2001) actually reported the opposite effect of exogenous spatial cues. However, a 
comprehensive series of experiments by Seifried and Ulrich (2011) established expanded subjective 
duration for stimuli at cued locations using a range of cue-types and temporal judgment tasks, and 
for durations up to at least 300 ms; increased apparent duration for items at exogenously-cued 
locations is therefore a general result.  
 Insight into the origins of this effect comes from the separate observation that directed 
attention can impair temporal resolution. For visual stimuli, exogenously cuing a spatial location 
improves the detection of spatial gaps in stimuli presented at that location but hinders the ability to 
discriminate between two brief flashes and a single continuous presentation (Yeshurun & Levy, 
2003). Temporal order judgments are similarly impaired by this kind of exogenous attentional cuing 
(Hein, Rolke, & Ulrich, 2006). Yeshurun and Levy attributed this impaired temporal processing to 
enhanced activity of the parvocellular neurons representing the attended location, with a 
corresponding decrease in magnocellular activity. Parvocellular neurons have smaller receptive 
fields (affording better spatial processing) but longer response latencies, resulting in less precise 
temporal coding. Consistent with this, detecting stimulus offset takes longer at cued locations 
(Rolke, Ulrich, & Bausenhart, 2006). This neurophysiological mechanism may therefore explain the 
prolonged apparent duration of cued stimuli, but the specific argument is restricted to visual stimuli 
and exogenous cuing (endogenous cuing does not impair temporal resolution in the same way; Hein, 
Rolke, & Ulrich, 2006); furthermore, some evidence suggests that the impaired temporal 
discrimination at cued locations is due to a speed-accuracy trade-off rather than to the sluggish 
activity of parvocellular neurons (Chica & Christie, 2009).  
Feature-based attending. Attention can be directed to particular stimulus features (for 
reviews, see Kanwisher & Wojciulik, 2000; Maunsell & True, 2006; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004). Ono, 
Yamada, Chujo, and Kawahara (2007) have provided evidence that directing attention to particular 
stimulus features modulates subjective time. On each trial two stimuli (a circle-pattern and a square-
pattern) were presented, with one stimulus type designated the ‘target’ for a given block of trials. 
Participants indicated the left-right location of the target; another stimulus then appeared centrally, 
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and participants had to terminate its presentation after 2 seconds. Temporal productions were 
shorter (subjective time was longer) when this stimulus was the target from the first part of the trial 
than when it was the distractor. In other words, apparent duration was longer for stimuli whose 
features had recently been the focus of attention.  
Time-based attending. Attention can also be directed at particular points in time, both 
intentionally and by the temporal structure of the task. Studies of endogenous temporal orienting 
present a symbolic cue at the start of the trial to signal when a target will appear (e.g., after a ‘short’ 
or ‘long’ delay). Target detection and discrimination are improved when the cue is valid (e.g., Correa, 
Lupiáñez, Milliken, & Tudela, 2004; Coull & Nobre, 1998; Miniussi, Wilding, Coull, & Nobre, 1999), 
with corresponding enhancement of early evoked responses (Correa, Lupiáñez, Milliken, & Tudela, 
2004). Thus, people are able to focus processing resources at a particular moment, using a network 
of brain regions that partially overlaps with those activated by endogenous spatial orienting (Coull, 
Frith, Büchel, & Nobre, 2000; Coull & Nobre, 1998). 
This endogenous temporal orienting also affects time perception (Correa, Sanabria, Spence, 
Tudela, & Lupiáñez, 2006). Each trial began with a written cue indicating, with 75% validity, whether 
the target stimuli would appear ‘early’ or ‘late’ (i.e., after 400 or 1400 ms). The targets were two 
LEDs attached to the sides of the monitor, and participants had to indicate which was turned on first. 
These temporal order judgments were more accurate when the orienting cue was valid, indicating 
that participants’ endogenous temporal orienting had improved their temporal resolution. This 
study did not examine the effects of intentional temporal orienting on subjective duration and, as far 
as we know, no other study has done so; it would be helpful to establish whether orienting to a 
particular point in time expands apparent duration in the same way as endogenous spatial and 
modality orienting.  
Temporal orienting can also arise exogenously by virtue of the temporal structure of sensory 
information (e.g., Jones, 1976, 2004; Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 1999). The most famous 
examples involve varying the interval between a neutral warning signal (e.g., a fixation cross) and 
the arrival of the target. When this foreperiod is manipulated between blocks of trials (a fixed 
foreperiod design), longer intervals result in worse performance, presumably because internal timing 
grows more variable with increasing duration (e.g., Mattes & Ulrich, 1997). By contrast, when short 
and long foreperiods are intermixed in a variable foreperiod design, longer intervals lead to better 
performance, presumably because at the ‘short’ foreperiod the observer is uncertain about whether 
or not the stimulus will occur, but once that timepoint has been and gone they can be confident that 
the target will arrive at the later time (e.g., Grondin & Rammsayer, 2003). The implicit temporal 
expectations generated by foreperiods have traditionally been assumed to affect motor preparation 
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(Hackley, 2009; Müller-Gethmann, Ulrich, & Rinkenauer, 2003), but it has become clear that they 
boost perceptual processing. For example, participants were faster and more accurate at detecting 
which side of a square contained a break when the fixed foreperiod was 800 ms than when it was 
2400 ms (Rolke & Hoffman, 2007). Similarly, tone frequency discrimination (Bausenhart, Rolke, & 
Ulrich, 2007) and letter identification (Rolke, 2008) are better at short foreperiods, reflecting faster 
onset of evidence accumulation when stimulus arrival is more predictable (Bausenhart, Rolke, 
Seibold, & Ulrich, 2010; Jepma, Wagenmakers, & Nieuwenhuis, 2012; Seibold, Bausenhart, Rolke, & 
Ulrich, 2011). Vangkilde, Coull, & Bundesen (2012) provide recent evidence that these temporal 
expectations improve the quality of sensory information, and the speed of perceptual processing.  
These changes in perceptual processing have corresponding effects on time perception.  
Grondin and Rammsayer (2003) had participants classify time intervals that varied around 500-ms as 
‘short’ or ‘long’, with the foreperiod between their response and the next stimulus varying randomly 
from trial to trial. Longer foreperiods led to steeper psychometric functions and shifted the bisection 
point to the left, indicating improved temporal resolution and longer apparent duration for the more 
expected stimuli (recall that, when short and long foreperiods are intermixed, stimuli are more 
temporally predictable after long foreperiods). The effect of implicit orienting on subjective duration 
replicated for visually- and aurally-defined target intervals and across a range of foreperiods, 
generalized to shorter target durations (centred on 100 ms), and has been replicated in other work 
(e.g., Gamache, Grondin, and Zakay, 2011; Los & Horoufchin, 2011).   
A separate line of work has concentrated on the temporal expectations generated by more 
complex event sequences. Of particular importance is dynamic attending theory (DAT; 1976, 2004; 
Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 1999), which describes how attention is guided in time by the 
predictable, hierarchical temporal/non-temporal structures of complex stimulus sequences (e.g., the 
rhythm and melody of music; 1976, 2004; Jones & Boltz, 1989; Large & Jones, 1999). In support of 
DAT, sequences which end earlier than expected are judged “short” whereas those that end late are 
judged “long” (Jones, Boltz, & Klein, 1993), with corresponding effects for other types of time-
judgment task such as tempo-assessment (e.g., Barnes & Jones, 2000; Boltz, 1992, McAuley & Kidd, 
1998).  
Importantly, the expectations generated by rhythmic structure also affect non-temporal 
processing; detection and discrimination are improved for stimuli whose onset fits with the rhythmic 
structure of preceding events than for items presented at unexpected times (e.g., Boltz, 1993; Cravo, 
Rohenkohl, Wyart, & Nobre, 2013; Jones, Moynihan, MacKenzie, & Puente, 2002; Miller, Carlson, & 
McAuley, 2013; see Bauer, Jaeger, Thorne, Bendizen, & Debener, 2015, for a recent null result, and 
Henry & Herrmann, 2014, for a recent review). (Notably, these studies often find impaired 
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performance for ‘late’ stimuli as well as ‘early’ ones, in contradistinction to the build-up of temporal 
expectations assumed in foreperiod studies). These changes in processing efficiency are again 
accompanied by expanded apparent duration: McAuley and Kim Fromboluti (2014) recently found 
that tones which occurred earlier than would be expected from a preceding rhythmic sequence were 
judged shorter than those that occurred on time, where those that arrived later than usual were 
judged longer. 
Thus, implicit temporal orienting, like intentional orienting, improves perceptual clarity and 
information extraction, and expands the apparent duration of attended stimuli.  
Attentional capture by significant stimuli. Attention is not just driven by predictive 
spatiotemporal cues: some stimuli are selected for preferential processing by virtue of their 
properties and significance. Indeed, we saw in Section 2 that salience is an over-arching principle 
behind the effects of basic non-temporal properties on time perception, and salient stimuli are 
preferentially processed and perceptually vivid by virtue of their attentional capture (see, for 
example, Eimer, Kiss, Press, & Sauter, 2009; Itti, 2007; Itti & Koch, 2001; Theeuwes, 2010). Stimuli 
can also capture attention by virtue of their biological significance rather than their novelty or 
distinctiveness. We describe two examples that illustrate how such effects influence subjective time. 
Looming Motion. Franconceri and Simons (2003) reported that attention is automatically 
captured by stimuli that are moving towards the observer (looming). Participants searched among 
distractor letters to find which of two target letters was present. Each letter was hidden behind an 
individual mask; on some trials one of these masks started smaller than the others and expanded to 
be the same size as the rest immediately before the start of the visual search (looming motion); on 
other trials one mask started larger than the rest and shrank to their size (receding motion). When 
the target appeared at the location of the looming motion, response times were independent of the 
number of distractors, indicating attentional capture by this type of motion; this was not observed 
for the receding motion. Despite some controversy about this result (Abrams & Christ, 2005, 2006; 
Franconeri & Simons, 2005) the prioritization of looming stimuli has been found in other studies, and 
does not require motion onset (von Mühlenen & Lleras, 2007; Skarratt, Cole, & Gellatly, 2009). 
The cuing effect of looming motion is mirrored in studies of subjective duration. van 
Wassenhove et al. (2008) found that smoothly-animated looming discs were judged to last longer 
than receding ones, and this effect transcended the relative frequencies of the two types of motion. 
Similarly, Ono and Kitazawa (2010) had participants judge the time interval between two circles 
presented in a display that included depth cues. The same interval was judged longer when the first 
circle was small and the second was large than when the order was reversed. That is, subjective 
duration was expanded for looming motion. The looming-receding difference has also been found 
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for auditory and audio-visual stimuli (Grassi & Darwin, 2006; Grassi & Pavan, 2012, although the 
latter found no effect for purely visual stimuli).  
Interesting, Ono and Kitazawa found no effect of looming motion on subjective time when 
the trajectory implied no observer-collision with the object, mirroring the finding that attentional 
capture is greater for objects on a collision path than for those with a near-miss trajectory (Lin, 
Franconeri, & Enns, 2007). Taken together, the data suggest that the biological significance of a 
stimulus class can drive the allocation of processing resources, with a corresponding expansion of 
apparent duration. 
Emotion. Emotional stimuli typically attract attention and are preferentially processed (see 
Yiend, 2010, for a review). Emotional items have lower detection thresholds (e.g., Calvo & Esteves, 
2005), are perceptually more vivid (e.g., Todd, Talmi, Schmitz, Susskind, & Anderson, 2012), and are 
located faster during visual search (e.g., Öhman, Flykt, & Esteves, 2001) than neutral ones, even 
after controlling for low-level stimulus features. When emotional and neutral stimuli are briefly 
presented side by side, attention is oriented to the emotional item such that detection and 
identification is superior for targets that subsequently appear at this location (e.g., Lipp & 
Derakshan, 2005) – and disengagement from the location of emotional items takes longer than for 
neutral images (e.g., Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002). Threatening stimuli (e.g., angry faces, snakes) are 
particularly likely to be preferentially processed, presumably because of their biological significance. 
Moreover, individual differences in background mood and clinical status moderate the effects of 
emotional stimuli (Yiend, 2010). 
The enhanced processing of emotional stimuli is matched by an expansion in their subjective 
duration. Droit-Volet, Brunot, and Niedenthal (2004) provided a prototypical illustration. They used a 
bisection task in which the training phase established anchor durations of 400 and 1600 ms using a 
neutral shape, followed by a test phase in which photographs of neutral, sad, happy, and angry faces 
were displayed for intermediate durations that the participant classified as closer to the ‘short’ or 
‘long’ standard. Relative to neutral faces the bisection point was shifted leftwards for all three 
emotional expressions, indicating longer subjective duration – with the overestimation particularly 
pronounced for angry faces.  
This effect has been widely replicated with faces (e.g., Droit-Volet & Gil, 2009), pictures (e.g., 
Angrillo et al., 1997; Grommet, Droit-Volet, Gil, Hemmes, Baker, & Brown, 2010) and sounds (e.g., 
Mella, Conty, & Pouthas, 2011; Noulhiane, Mella, Samson, Ragot, & Pouthas, 2007), in children as 
young as 3 years (Gil, Niedenthal, & Droit-Volet, 2007), and in cases where the emotional stimulus is 
presented below conscious awareness (Yamada & Kawabe, 2011). These effects are not due to a 
low-level confound: the apparent duration of a neutral stimulus can be increased by conditioning an 
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association to an emotionally-charged image (Kliegl, Watrin, & Huckhauf, 2015) -- echoing the 
finding that threat conditioning can direct attention to previously-neutral images (Batty, Cave, & 
Pauli, 2005).  
Emotion effects on time perception do not reduce to simple differences in arousal (e.g., 
Angrilli et al., 1997; Gil & Droit-Volet, 2012; Lake, LaBar, & Meck, in press; Mella, Conty, & Pouthas, 
2011), and depend on the particular emotion, stimulus duration, and judgment task in ways that are 
not always consistent (e.g., Bar-Haim et al., 2010; Fayolle & Droit-Volet, 2014; Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2011, 2012; Grommet, Droit-Volet, Gil, Hemmes, Baker, and Brown, 2010; Lee, Seelam, & O’Brien, 
2011). However, the prolonged apparent duration for threatening items is particularly robust, 
mirroring the strong evidence for superior processing of threatening stimuli in studies of visual 
attention. Moreover, just as the effects of threatening stimuli on attention are modulated by 
individual differences in mood and threat-sensitivity, so too is the expansive effect of threatening 
stimuli on subjective time. Tipples (2011), for example, found overestimation of duration for both 
fearful and threatening faces relative to neutral ones, and the effect was moderated by individual 
differences in fearfulness (see also Bar-Haim, Kerem, Lamy, & Zakay, 2010; Tipples, 2008).   
The complexity of emotion effects is unsurprising given the diversity of emotional stimuli 
and responses, but the data indicate that changes in perceptual clarity and processing that result 
from emotional relevance produce corresponding changes in apparent duration. 
Selective attention and the processing principle. The allocation of attention may be based 
on the time, location, or sensory channel at which the stimulus is presented; it may be driven by the 
biological significance of the object; and it may be driven by exogenous spatio-temporal cues or 
endogenous shifts in focus. These shifts in attention can enhance processing of particular locations, 
modalities, or features. In all cases, the subjective duration of the attended object is increased. This 
unifying result provides further support for the processing principle: attending to a stimulus 
improves its subjective vividity and facilitates information processing, with a corresponding 
expansion in apparent duration. Attentional selection therefore complements the effects of stimulus 
properties discussed in Section 2. Indeed, to the extent that the effects of non-temporal features are 
due to their effects on salience, the line between ‘external’ physical properties and ‘internal’ 
allocation of attention is blurred: what matters is how the interplay of these factors shapes the 
overall clarity of the percept. 
The powerful connection between attentional selection and subjective time suggests several 
lines for future research, including: 
    1) Generalizing to other types of attentional selection. Tactile and cross-modal cuing, for 
example, can enhance processing (e.g., Burton et al., 1999; McDonald, Green, Störmer, & Hillyard, 
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2012) and should therefore expand apparent duration. In addition, the time course of attentional 
shifts should produce complementary changes in subjective time. With exogenous cuing, processing 
at the cued location is actually impaired once the cue-target delay increases beyond a few hundred 
milliseconds (e.g., Posner & Cohen, 1984). We predict that this inhibition of return (IOR) will produce 
a corresponding decrease in subjective duration at the cued location. Likewise, attention can be 
guided to particular locations by past experience with the same visual configurations (‘contextual 
cuing’; Chun & Jiang, 1998). Again, we would expect this implicit learning of context to boost the 
apparent duration of targets at anticipated locations. A key goal will be to integrate measures of 
perceptual clarity and subjective duration in the same experimental session, so that researchers can 
directly test the correspondence between the two.   
2) Examining the effect of task relevance. Attentional selection depends on the organism’s 
current goals and disposition (e.g., Bacon & Egeth, 1994). Do task demands also modulate the 
apparent duration of otherwise identical stimuli?  As for the effects of emotional material, individual 
differences might be important: the apparent duration of a monetary stimulus, for example, may 
depend on the participant’s acquisitiveness. 
3) Clarifying the mechanisms by which selective attention affects the sense of time. As 
noted, improved onset detection and delayed offset detection may be contributing factors but are 
not the whole story (e.g., Enns et al., 1999; Rolke et al., 2006); likewise studies with emotional 
stimuli suggest a slope effect, implying an increase in the rate of growth of subjective time (not just a 
shorter onset-detection latency, which would produce a fixed effect that is independent of the 
subsequent duration of the item) -- at least for intervals up to about 1 second (e.g., Gil & Droit-Volet, 
2012). More generally, however, we need to examine the effects of selective attention across a wide 
range of durations and to measure onset- and offset-detection latencies to quantify the separate 
processes underlying changes in time perception. 
 
Divided Attention 
Moving from selective attention to stimuli to the distribution of processing resources across 
tasks, a large body of work has examined how temporal judgments are affected by the activities that 
are performed during the timed interval. This research has a long tradition (e.g., Yerkes & Urban, 
1906) and has often focussed on situations where participants perform a task such as card-sorting 
for several minutes before estimating how long they spent on it (e.g., Hicks, Miller, & Kinsbourne, 




Doing two things at once: Dual-task effects on time judgments. Temporal judgments are 
influenced by a wide variety of secondary tasks. In one influential study, S.W. Brown (1997) had 
participants make a series of temporal productions by pressing a key every 2 or 5 seconds at a 
steady rate throughout a two minute trial, while the participant simultaneously undertook a 
separate cognitive task: pursuit rotor tracking (manually following a visual target); visual search 
(scanning a page and marking with a pen each occurrence of a target letter); and mental arithmetic 
(subtraction problems); all three tasks came in ‘easy’ and ‘hard’ versions. In baseline trials, 
participants completed either the time production or cognitive tasks in isolation. Compared to 
baseline performance, undertaking a secondary task disrupted timing: temporal productions became 
more variable and, in general, longer, and these effects became more pronounced as the difficulty of 
the secondary task increased.  
These findings have been replicated using a wide range of different secondary tasks (see 
S.W. Brown, 2008, 2010, for reviews). In a recent comprehensive meta-analysis of 117 experiments, 
Block, Hancock, and Zakay (2010) found that prospective duration judgments were systematically 
shorter and more variable with higher cognitive load. The effects were strongest for production 
tasks like those used by Brown (1997), but generalize to verbal estimation and reproduction. 
Interestingly, for retrospective duration estimates (where the participant does not know that a time 
judgment will be required until after the interval), cognitive load lengthens subjective duration, 
suggesting a memory-based mechanism in which judged duration is proportional to the number of 
segments or changes in the retrieved interval (Block et al., 2010). 
The effects of secondary tasks on prospective time estimates are typically explained in terms 
of attentional allocation: People may direct limited processing capacity towards either ‘temporal’ or 
‘non-temporal’ information (Brown, 2008; Buhusi & Meck, 2009; Michon, 1972; Thomas & Weaver, 
1975), and directing attention away from time results in less accrual of temporal information and 
ergo shorter and more variable temporal estimates. ‘Temporal information’ risks being ill-defined, 
but one conceptualization posits an attentional ‘gate’ that controls the flow of pulses from a 
pacemaker into an accumulator during the interval (Zakay & Block, 1997); another suggestion is that 
attention determines the latency with which the flow of pulses begins at stimulus onset (Lejeune, 
1998; Meck, 1984) (see Figure 4 panel A). 
The allocation of mental resources to timing is under intentional control. In one 
demonstration, Macar, Grondin, & Casini (1994) presented sequences of words and had people 
count the number of animal names and then reproduce the duration of the whole list under 
instructions to allocate 0, 25, 50, 75, or 100% or their attention to the temporal task (with the 
remainder dedicated to the non-temporal task). Temporal reproductions shortened as more 
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attention was devoted to the animal-counting task, again suggesting that subjective duration was 
reduced when participants were not ‘attending to time’ (see also Franssen and Vandierendonck, 
2002; Zakay, 1998). Likewise, when participants judged both the duration and luminance of a light, 
instructions to devote greater attention to the luminance task resulted in poorer temporal 
discrimination and shorter subjective duration (Casini & Macar, 1997). 
Attention and anticipation. As well as comparing time judgments with and without a 
secondary task, researchers have examined the effects of varying the time at which a secondary 
event occurs during a to-be-timed interval. In Casini and Macar (1997), participants studied a green 
light whose intensity briefly increased by either a small or large amount during the course of its 
presentation. After offset, they indicated both the duration of the light and the size of the intensity 
change. When the intensity increment occurred later in the presentation, the subjective duration of 
the light was reduced. This location effect has been taken to indicate that participants devote some 
attention to monitoring for the intensity change, diverting resources away from the accrual of 
temporal information: the later the intensity change occurs, the longer this monitoring goes on and 
the shorter the subjective duration. The location effect has been widely replicated (e.g., Fortin, 
1999; Rousseau, Picard, & Pitre, 1984), and there is some evidence that anticipation of a secondary 
signal may produce the effect even when there is no requirement to process it, although support for 
this is mixed (Champagne & Fortin, 2008; Gaudreault, Fortin, & Macar, 2010; Macar, 2002).  
In fact, anticipation effects can disrupt timing without employing a secondary task at all, by 
inserting a break in the stimulus presentation. An early example is provided by Fortin and Masse 
(2000). On each trial, participants pressed a key to start presentation of a tone and made a second 
key press to terminate the sound. After learning to produce 2-second intervals, participants 
undertook a test phase in which the tone was interrupted at various points by silent breaks of 
between 3 and 6 seconds, with the task still being to make the total duration of the tone (excluding 
the gap) 2 seconds. The key finding was that productions were shorter when the break came 500 ms 
into the tone presentation than when it came after 1500 ms. Just as for dual-task studies, Fortin and 
Masse attributed this location effect to attention-sharing: before the break, participants are 
monitoring for the interruption, which diverts processing away from temporal information. The later 
that the break occurs, the more time information is lost and the shorter the subjective duration of 
the pre-break segment – with the result that it takes longer for the total judged duration of the tone 
to reach 2 seconds.  
Consistent with this, subsequent experiments showed that the temporal productions were 
even longer for ‘no break’ trials, where the participant waited for an interruption throughout the 
whole of the tone presentation; moreover, signalling that there will be no break at the start of the 
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trial greatly reduced this effect, implying that when people are no longer monitoring for the 
interruption of the tone they can direct more attention to time and accrue subjective duration more 
rapidly. The effects of break expectancy have been replicated in other studies using different time-
estimation procedures (e.g., Fortin et al., 2009; Fortin & Tremblay, 2006; Tremblay & Fortin, 2003) 
and are widely found in animals (e.g., Buhusi and Meck, 2009). 
An ‘executive gate’? A straightforward attention-allocation model implies a common pool of 
resources used by both the temporal and non-temporal tasks. This, in turn, predicts bidirectional 
interference: devoting more attention to time should lower performance on a secondary task (S.W. 
Brown, 1997). However, those studies that have examined performance on the non-temporal task 
have not found universal two-way interference. In S.W. Brown’s (1997) experiment, for example, 
temporal production impaired mental arithmetic but not motor pursuit or visual search. In a survey 
of 33 studies, S.W. Brown (2006) noted that bidirectional interference was present for tasks such as 
mental arithmetic, proof-reading, or searching working memory, but that activities such as motor 
tracking or visual search were unaffected by concurrent timing. Bidirectional interference seems to 
be most pronounced for tasks that tap the putative ‘central executive’ component of working 
memory (Block et al., 2010; S.W. Brown, 2008), such as random-number generation and sequential 
reasoning (S.W. Brown, 2006).  
This has led to the proposal that, rather than an undifferentiated processing capacity, 
‘attending to time’ specifically uses executive control processes – those which “co-ordinate working 
memory subsystems, focus and switch attention, and activate representations within long-term 
memory” (Fortin, Schweickert, Gaudreault, & Viau-Quesnel, 2010, p. 580). Within the pacemaker-
accumulator framework, Block et al. (2010) suggest replacing the putative attentional gate with an 
‘executive gate’. The close links between executive processing and timing make sense given the 
temporal aspects of many executive functions (sequential processing, scheduling, etc.) and the 
shared neural substrates of timing and executive processing (S.W. Brown, 2008). 
Despite the appeal of this suggestion, it has a number of shortcomings. First, despite task-
switching being a prototypical executive function, recent work by Fortin et al. (2010) found that it 
did not disrupt timing (although S.W. Brown, Collier, & Night, 2013, reported a conflicting result). 
More importantly, the executive-function account does not explain why timing is disrupted by many 
tasks which make very little use of executive control, such as gauging the size of a luminance 
increment or monitoring for a break in the presentation of a tone. Indeed, as Brown et al. (2013) 
recently noted, “virtually any type of distractor task interferes with temporal judgments” (p. 947). 
One methodological problem here is that researchers have not equated the difficulty of the 
temporal and non-temporal tasks. It may be that the unidirectional interference arises because the 
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timing tasks are simply more difficult than the secondary tasks and therefore more vulnerable to 
interference. Using perceptual discrimination as a secondary activity, it ought to be possible to 
ensure that temporal and non-temporal judgments are matched for difficulty.  
Divided attention and the processing principle. The processing principle is the 
generalization that the subjective duration of a stimulus is positively related to its perceptual clarity. 
As such, it does not directly speak to the effects of dividing attention between judging time and 
judging other stimulus properties or performing secondary tasks. Indeed, in many dual-task studies 
there is no one stimulus whose duration is to be judged; rather, participants are confronted with 
multiple, overlapping stimuli and self-generated actions (e.g., trying to produce a button press every 
3 seconds whilst searching a sheet of paper for every occurrence of the letter ‘T’). The processing 
principle does not readily extend to such complex situations. Even in the simpler ‘anticipation’ tasks, 
it is unclear how interrupting a stimulus with a secondary event or gap (or how anticipating these 
events) would be expected to influence the perceptual vividity of the pre- and post-interruption 
segments; and whatever the effects on each segment, the overall duration judgment will depend on 
integrating separate representations in ways which are not currently well-understood (Bryce & 
Bratzke, 2015; Matthews, 2013).  
The processing principle is therefore best regarded as orthogonal to the resource allocation 
processes that underlie dual-task performance: the representation of stimulus duration conforms to 
the processing principle, but how much mental capacity is devoted to constructing this 
representation, and how much weight this information receives, depend on the organism’s goals 
and competing task-demands. Nonetheless, an important aim for the future will be to establish how 
the totality of perceptual experience shapes subjective time – that is, how people integrate 
information from multiple, temporally overlapping stimuli, with varying perceptual strengths, to 
form an overall sense of time. 
  
The relevance of subjective time to attention researchers 
The links between attention and subjective time carries several implications and 
opportunities for attention researchers. 
First, subjective duration provides an aspect of human experience to which attention 
researchers can apply their existing theories and methodologies, testing generality and, potentially, 
finding results that challenge current thinking. As noted above, questions such as whether inhibition 
of return affects the subjective duration of targets at cued/uncued locations provide straightforward 
empirical opportunities. Similarly, researchers who develop and use theoretical models to predict 
the allocation of visual or auditory attention (e.g., Itti & Koch, 2001; Oldoni et al., 2013) could see 
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whether their accounts successfully account for the apparent duration of targets appearing at 
particular locations – perhaps refining their models to yield precise quantitative predictions. 
Relatedly, attention researchers might consider using subjective duration as an index of attention to 
a stimulus – a sign that it is being preferentially processed by virtue of its basic properties, 
spatiotemporal position, or goal-relevance, which could be explored more deeply by subsequent 
studies of discriminability, subjective salience, memory encoding, and so forth. 
Second, there has been growing appreciation that spatial and temporal allocation of 
attention may share common mechanisms and neural substrates (Coull & Nobre, 1998; Rohenkohl, 
Gould, Pessoa, & Nobre, 2014); the finding that spatial and temporal orienting exert comparable 
effects on the phenomenology of subjective time adds weight to this argument and provides 
impetus to the quest for integrated accounts. It also raises the question of whether attention 
allocation might take place in subjective time. We have seen that temporal expectations can sharpen 
the representation of stimuli that arrive ‘when expected’. The processing principle implies that these 
expectations will depend on the perceptual strength of the stimuli that define the to-be-timed 
interval. As a simple example: if the same foreperiod is filled with a low intensity tone, it will seem 
shorter than if it is filled with a high intensity tone. These changes in subjective time will presumably 
affect whether a subsequent target seems to arrive late, early, or on time, with corresponding 
changes in detection and discrimination accuracy. 
Finally, we have noted that the processing principle currently applies to relatively simple 
situations where people judge a single stimulus. How are the representations of multiple, 
temporally-overlapping items combined to produce an overall sense of time for complex, on-going 
patterns of multi-modal experience? This major theoretical challenge is one that attention and 
multi-tasking researchers are well-placed to help solve. 
 
Section Summary 
 Attention profoundly affects time perception. Directing attention to a stimulus facilitates 
processing and prolongs apparent duration; directing mental resources towards a temporal 
judgment task similarly lengthens subjective time. We have suggested that these effects can usefully 
be construed as part of a general information-processing framework, which could serve as a starting 
point for future theoretical and empirical work. The foregoing research also highlights the key role of 
working memory in timing, a point that we explore further in the next section.  
 
Section 4: Subjective Time and Memory 
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Memory is central to temporal perception and judgment. As noted above retrospective 
judgments are thought to be based on memory for the number of changes that took place during 
the interval (Block et al., 2010; Poynter, 1983). In the prospective tasks that are the focus of this 
review, time judgments depend on the comparison of the target duration with previously-encoded 
intervals (Matell & Meck, 2004; Wearden, 1992). Moreover, the accuracy and precision of temporal 
representations changes as a function of experience both with the target duration (e.g., Bueti & 
Buonomano, 2014; Kristofferson, 1980; MacDonald, Cheng, & Meck, 2012; Matthews & Grondin, 
2012; cf., Jones and Wearden, 2003) and with other recently-encountered intervals (e.g., G. D. A. 
Brown et al., 2005; Dyjas, Bausenhart, & Ulrich, 2012; Hellström, 2003). Recent work has explored 
the effects of aging (Droit-Volet, 2003; Droit-Volet & Zélanti, 2013; Gooch, Stern, & Rakitin, 2009) 
and emotion (Cocenas-Silva, Bueno, & Droit-Volet, 2013) on memory for time, has examined 
whether a consolidation process occurs for duration memories similar to the synaptic/cellular 
mechanisms observed for other types of memory (Cocenas-Silva, Bueno, & Droit-Volet, 2014), and 
has formally modelled the formation and interference of temporal memories within the framework 
of internal clock models (L.A. Jones & Wearden, 2003; Ogden, Wearden, & Jones, 2008).  
Here, we focus on memory as it relates to the non-temporal aspects of the stimulus – that is, 
on how the subjective duration of an item changes as a function of its previous encoding and 
storage. Following the ‘textbook’ organization, we first consider low-level sensory adaptation to 
stimulus features and then progress to representations of items encountered in the past few 
seconds (‘short term’ memory), which may be maintained and manipulated for an on-going task 
(‘working memory’), and end with the effects of memory for items encoded several minutes, hours, 
or even days before (‘long term’ memory). Like many other authors, we use this as a convenient way 




We begin by considering recent work on the effects of low-level adaptation to stimulus 
features. Although this type of prior-exposure effect might typically be thought of as ‘sensory’ rather 
than ‘mnemonic’ (indeed, some of the following material could have appeared in Section 2 of this 
paper), we include it here because, like other ‘memory’ effects, it concerns the effects of previous  
encounters with/encoding of the stimulus on the perception of time.. 
Adaptation is the change in processing that follows exposure to a constant sensory input, 
such as when one ceases to feel of one’s clothes within a few seconds of putting them on. The effect 
underlies visual illusions in which unchanging peripheral stimuli seem to fade away when one 
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maintains constant fixation (Martinez-Conde, Macknik, & Hubel, 2004), and also occurs with higher-
level representations, as illustrated by face aftereffects (e.g., Leopold, O’Toole, Vetter, & Blanz, 
2001). The reduced perceptual strength that accompanies sustained, steady stimulation is based on 
a ‘recalibration’ of the sensory system to become more sensitive around the adapted level (see e.g., 
Clifford, 2002; Thompson & Burr, 2009), and this occurs for high-level representations as well as low-
level features (e.g., Rhodes, Watson, Jeffery, & Clifford, 2010). 
Interest in the role of adaptation in time perception was recently sparked by Johnston, 
Arnold, and Nishida (2006). They presented a drifting sine grating to the left or right of a central 
fixation point. The grating had a temporal frequency of 20 Hz and alternated direction every 2 
seconds to prevent motion aftereffects. After adapting to the grating for 15 seconds participants 
were sequentially presented with two gratings drifting at 10-Hz and judged which had longer 
duration: a 600-ms standard, presented on the adapted side, or a variable-duration comparison 
stimulus, presented on the unadapted side. There was substantial duration compression in the 
adapted location: the standard seemed to last less time than an equivalent stimulus in the 
unadapted location. This effect was not due to onset- or offset-detection latencies, and also 
occurred with simple luminance flicker rather than spatial drift. 
Adaptation a particular stimulus feature can therefore produce a spatially-specific reduction 
in the subjective duration of subsequent stimuli at that location. Johnston and colleagues have 
argued that this effect is retinotopic and sub-cortical: it occurs with narrow adapting stimuli 
(consistent with the small receptive fields of early visual neurons; Ayhan, Bruno, Nishida, & 
Johnston, 2009) and when the orientations of the adaptor and target stimuli differ by 90 degrees 
(orientation sensitivity only emerges in cortical area V1; Johnston et al., 2006). On the other hand, 
Burr, Tozzi, and Morrone (2007) shifted the fixation point after adaptation such that the standard 
stimulus occupied either the retinotopic or spatiotopic position of the adaptor, or a completely new 
position. Only the spatiotopic condition compressed subjective duration, indicating a cortical locus 
for the adaptation effect (see Bruno, Ayhan, & Johnston, 2010; Burr, Cicchini, Arrighi, & Morrone, 
2011; Morrone, Cicchini, & Burr, 2010 for further discussion). Recent work suggests effects at 
multiple levels in the processing hierarchy (Bruno, Ng, & Johnston, 2013; Latimer, Curran, & Benton, 
2014). 
Importantly, adaptation effects have been found for other stimulus features, with shorter 
adaptation periods, and in different modalities. Curran and Benton (2012) adapted participants to an 
upward-drifting dot pattern and found compressed duration for subsequent stimuli in the adapted 
location, but only when they drifted in the same direction as the adaptor. This difference was not 
due to changes in the time taken to detect stimulus onset or offset. Elsewhere, Bruno and Johnston 
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(2010) found an adaptation effect for luminance contrast using prior exposures of just 1.5 seconds, 
and Watanabe, Amemiya, Nishida, and Johnston (2010) found shortened subjective duration for 
vibrotactile stimuli presented at locations which had adapted to higher-frequency vibrations. One 
particularly powerful demonstration was recently provided by Zhou et al. (2014), who had 
participants compare two identical Gabor patches presented to the left and right of fixation. The 
first, standard stimulus was preceded by a 107-ms presentation of another Gabor patch, identical to 
the other stimuli except for its orientation. This prime compressed the apparent duration of the 
standard, and the size of this compression diminished as the orientation difference between the 
prime and standard increased.  
Thus, as a general principle, recent exposure to basic stimulus properties leads to localized 
reductions in perceptual vividity and the compression of subjective duration for subsequent stimuli 
sharing those features. The effects of adaptation therefore provide a further illustration of the 
processing principle: adaptation reduces the effective strength of the sensory input, weakening the 
final percept and shortening subjective duration. This consequence of prior exposure helps to shed 
light on the complex effects of stimulus repetition discussed next. 
 
Sensory and Short-term memory 
Moving ‘up’ from studies of basic stimulus properties to the encoding of whole objects, many 
studies have examined how recent exposure to a stimulus influences its apparent duration. Much of 
this research has used a so-called ‘oddball’ paradigm pioneered by Tse et al. (2004) in which 
participants see or hear a standard stimulus several times in succession and a different stimulus is 
displayed somewhere towards the end of the sequence. For example, Tse et al. presented a static 
black disc for 1050 ms, separated by inter-stimulus intervals (ISIs) of 950-1150 ms. After every 7-12 
occurrences of the standard, an expanding black disc was presented for a variable duration and 
participants indicated whether it was shown for more or less time than the standards. The point of 
subjective equality indicated that the oddball only had to be on-screen for 675 ms to ‘feel as long’ as 
the 1050-ms standards . 
Tse et al.’s (2004) studies exaggerated the size of the novelty effect by using comparison 
durations that tended to be shorter than the standard, but the oddball effect remains robust when a 
symmetric distribution is used (Seifried & Ulrich, 2010) and has been replicated many times (e.g., 
New & Scholl, 2009; Pariyadath and Eagleman, 2007, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2011). The 
effect arises in both visual and auditory modalities (e.g., Kim & McAuley, 2013; Tse et al., 2004), and 
generalizes to other judgment tasks such as magnitude estimation and equality judgments 
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(Birngruber, Shroeter, & Ulrich, 2014; Tse et al., 2004) which has been taken to indicate a genuine 
perceptual distortion rather than a decision bias.  
The oddball task confounds stimulus novelty with position in the sequence (oddballs occur later 
in the stream) and involves comparing the single oddball’s duration against multiple standards. 
However, the repetition effect replicates when there are just two stimuli on each trial and the 
second is either a repetition of the first or a novel item (Matthews, 2011c). In addition, the first 
presentation in a train of repeated stimuli seems longer than subsequent occurrences (Rose & 
Summers, 1995). 
The repetition effect reported in these studies complements the low-level adaptation effects 
discussed above, but the two sets of findings have typically been treated separately, and researchers 
have offered several overlapping explanations for the oddball/immediate repetition effects 
described here. 
Attention to the non-repeated item. Tse et al. (2004) attributed the repetition effect to greater 
attention to novel stimuli, arguing that rare items “trigger[s] an increase in perceptual information 
processing” (Tse et al., 2004, p. 1187). This echoes our processing principle, and is supported by 
evidence that novel or unexpected stimuli commonly draw processing resources (e.g., Horstmann, 
2002; Irwin, Colcombe, Kramer, & Hahn, 2000; Meyer Niepel Rudolph Schützwohl 1991). A potential 
objection is that repeating an item can generate an expectation or ‘attentional set’ that improves its 
perceptual clarity, which in turn would make repeated items seem to last longer than novel ones 
(Ulrich, Nitschke, & Rammsayer, 2006) – an idea to which we return below. More generally, studies 
of repetition effects on subjective time have not assessed the processing of non-temporal features, 
and have positioned the novel and repeated items in the same spatial location. By independently 
assessing whether processing is enhanced for novel stimuli, and whether attention is drawn to their 
position, researchers could directly test the attention-capture hypothesis. 
Arousal. Ulrich et al. (2006) proposed that rare items are more arousing than repeated ones, 
leading to a brief elevation in the rate of an internal pacemaker. The repetition effect only emerges 
for stimuli longer than about 300 ms, consistent with it taking some time for the pacemaker to ‘ramp 
up’ in response to the novel item (Seifried & Ulrich, 2010). In addition, New and Scholl (2009) found 
that the apparent duration of a central square was expanded when a peripheral oddball occurs 
during its presentation, which they took as evidence for a generalized increase in arousal rather than 
a localized effect of directed attention to the novel stimulus. However, Pariyadath and Eagleman 
(2007) found no evidence that a visual oddball altered the apparent pitch of an accompanying tone – 
which would be expected if there were a truly global change in temporal processing -- and van 
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Wassenhove et al. (2008) similarly found no effect of an auditory oddball on the judged duration of 
an accompanying visual stimulus. 
Predictive coding. Repetition effects are central to Eagleman and Pariyadath’s (2009) coding 
efficiency account of time perception, described in Section 2 (Matthews et al., 2014). Recent 
exposure reduces the neural response to a repeated item. One view is that this repetition 
suppression is due to low-level processes such as neural fatigue; another is that it reflects predictive 
coding (De Baene & Vogels, 2010; Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Henson & Rugg, 2003). 
Predictive coding is the wide-ranging idea that the brain predicts sensory input, rather than simply 
processing incoming information ‘bottom up’. A common proposal is that back-projections from 
later stages in the processing hierarchy signal expectations, such that only information that deviates 
from predicted inputs (‘prediction error’) is passed on to the next  step in the representational 
hierarchy (e.g., Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999; see Clark, 2013, and the associated commentaries 
for a recent in-depth review).  
  Pariyadath and Eagleman (2007, 2008, 2012) attribute the reduced subjective duration of 
repeated items to repetition suppression, and favour a predictive-coding explanation. In keeping 
with this, the more times a repeated standard is presented in succession, and the greater the 
deviation between the oddball and the standard, the greater the relative subjective duration of a 
subsequent oddball (Kim & McAuley, 2013; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012.  
Moreover the subjective durations of novel and repeated stimuli are correlated with the 
strength, rather than the timing, of neural activity in high-level visual areas (Noguchi & Kakigi, 2006; 
see also Sadeghi, Pariyadath, Apte, Eagleman, & Cook, 2011), and the judged duration of oddballs 
increases with their discrepancy from the standard (i.e., with the mis-match between the ‘predicted’ 
and ‘observed’ stimuli; Pariyadath & Eagleman, 2012; Schindel, Rowlands, & Arnold, 2008) providing 
further support for the predictive-coding account [see also Zhou et al.’s (2014) study with Gabor 
patches, above].   
Repetition and expectation. The attention, arousal, and predictive-coding accounts share the 
assumption that it is the predictability of repeated items that compresses their apparent duration: 
items which have not previously (or recently) been seen are more captivating, arousing, and 
unpredictable than those which are held in short-term memory. The idea that stimulus repetition 
shapes implicit expectations is widespread in perception and memory research (e.g., Bodner & 
Masson, 2001) and is central to the predictive coding account of neural repetition suppression (e.g., 
Friston, 2005).  
A clear theoretical problem, however, is that the studies of attention reviewed above clearly 
demonstrate that making an item more predictable – as happens with repeated stimuli – tends to 
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increase rather than decrease its apparent duration. There is also an empirical problem, in that 
studies which only manipulate the memory-status of an item do not disambiguate the contribution 
of predictability and expectation from that of ‘mere’ repetition per se.  
However, mere-repetition and predictability effects can be separated by presenting two stimuli 
on each trial and varying the proportion of trials on which the second is a repeat of the first. If 
repetition effects are due to the mere recent encoding of the item, then they will depend only on 
whether the second stimulus in the pair is the same as the first. However, if the effect also depends 
on implicit expectations about forthcoming stimuli, then making repetition trials more common 
should enhance the expectation that the second image will be a repeat and correspondingly increase 
the size of the repetition effect. 
Neuroimaging studies using this approach have found that repetition suppression is more 
pronounced when repeat trials are common, suggesting that the reduced neural response reflects 
implicit expectations about the probability that the recently-encoded item will be encountered again 
(Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008; see also Mayrhauser, Bergmann, Crone, 
& Kronbichler, 2014; Summerfield, Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008; Summerfield, Wyart, 
Johnen, & de Gardelle, 2011), although a minority of studies have found that the repetition effect is 
independent of repetition probability (Kaliukhovich & Vogels, 2011; Kovács, Kaiser, Kaliukhovich, 
Vidnyanánszky, & Vogels, 2013). A similar pattern is found in many behavioural tasks. For example, 
in studies of masked priming, increasing the proportion of trials on which the target is a repeat of 
the prime leads to stronger facilitation of number judgments, lexical decision, and word naming, 
implying  that implicit expectations lead to the recruitment of recently-encoded stimuli to facilitate 
subsequent processing (Bodner & Dypvik, 2005; Bodner & Masson, 2001, 2004).  
Matthews (2015) recently applied this approach to temporal judgment. Participants saw two 
images on each trial and judged whether the second had longer or shorter duration than the first. 
Trials differed in whether the second image was a repeat of the first or a novel picture, and the 
proportion of ‘repeat’ trials varied between blocks. If short-term memory for a stimulus reduces its 
apparent duration by making it more expected, then the repetition effect should be more 
pronounced when repeats are common (the pattern seen in the neuroimaging data). However, 
making repetitions more probable reduced, eliminated, and even reversed the usual compression of 
subjective duration for recently-studied items. This argues against the expectation-based attention, 
arousal, and predictive-coding accounts described above; it is also incompatible with a simple ‘mere-
repetition’ effect, which predicts no effect of changing the repetition rate. 
Rather, the data suggest that short-term encoding of a stimulus produces two opposing effects: 
a mere-repetition effect that shortens apparent duration, and an expectancy effect that prolongs it. 
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The mere-repetition effect is analogous to the low-level adaptation effects described in the previous 
section, where we saw that recent, even quite brief prior exposure to a given stimulus feature can 
produce a spatially-specific compression for subsequent stimuli that share the adapted features. 
Countering this effect, the increased predictability of repeated items when repeats are common 
means that the first image in a pair would be a good cue to the features of the second and, 
analogous to the cuing paradigms discussed above, would be expected to improve the perceptual 
strength of the stimulus and expand its apparent duration. 
Consistent with this framework, Matthews (2015) found that increasing the interval between 
the first and second presentations of a given image to 2 seconds eliminated the usual compression 
of subjective duration, mirroring the rapid perceptual and neural recovery from brief adaptation 
(Glasser, Tsui, Pack, & Tadin, 2011) and suggesting a low-level process such as neural fatigue (De 
Baene & Vogels, 2010). In addition, changing the predictability of repeats affected performance 
when participants had to classify the gender of the images rather than judge their durations, with 
the data showing that the increased apparent duration of predictable items was matched by 
improved efficiency of information extraction. 
Immediate repetition and the processing principle. Recent exposure therefore has multiple 
effects on apparent duration. On the one hand, repetition reduces the effective strength of the 
sensory input via adaptation, and novel items are likely to be preferentially selected for processing 
because of their attention-grabbing salience. On the other, recent presentation is posited to 
generate an expectation that the same item will occur again, with a corresponding boost to 
perceptual clarity. The rather confusing pattern of data from the foregoing studies can therefore be 
understood in terms of the interplay between ‘bottom up’ and ‘top down’ factors posited by the 
processing principle; the same applies when we consider the active maintenance of recently-
encoded information in working memory. 
 
Working memory 
Maintaining a stimulus or feature in working memory modulates temporal judgments for 
stimuli with that property. Pan and Luo (2012) showed participants a square (the ‘cue’) followed by 
two coloured circles, one after the other, with the requirement to indicate which circle had the 
longer duration. One of the circles was the same colour as the cue; the other was different. Finally, 
participants saw a test stimulus and indicated whether it matched the cue – so participants had to 
hold the cue item in memory throughout the temporal judgement task. The probability of judging a 
test circle as lasting longer was elevated when its colour matched the item in working memory: 
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actively maintaining a stimulus representation in working memory expanded the judged duration of 
stimuli with matching features. 
This occurred even when the cue stimulus was replaced by a written colour name; 
maintaining this semantic information in working memory was sufficient to increase the judged 
duration of subsequent stimuli possessing that feature. The importance of active maintenance was 
demonstrated by a condition in which there was no requirement to remember the colour of the 
initial square: now the circle whose colour matched this cue was judged to have shorter duration, 
akin to the immediate repetition effect found in oddball tasks discussed above.  
Active maintenance may over-ride the effects of basic properties or salience. Bi, Liu, Yuan, 
and Huang (2014) had participants memorize a digit at the start of the trial and then compare the 
duration of two other digits. When neither of the digits in the comparison task matched the item in 
memory, the authors found the usual association between larger numbers and longer time 
judgments. However, this disappeared when one of the digits matched the item in working memory, 
suggesting that active maintenance over-rides any association between temporal and non-temporal 
magnitudes (e.g., Walsh, 2003), or salience-based expansion for larger numbers. The importance of 
active maintenance was again emphasized by the finding that no such modulation of the magnitude 
effect occurred when the requirement to memorize the initial digit was lifted.   
These results are reminiscent of Ono et al.’s (2007) study, described in Section 2, in which 
stimuli whose features had recently been searched for in a localization task had longer subjective 
duration than those whose features had recently been ignored. Taken together the results suggest 
that judged duration is longer for stimuli whose feature-representations are active when the 
stimulus is presented.  
These time-perception data accord with a broader body of work examining the neural and 
behavioural effects of maintaining a stimulus representation in working memory. For example, Soto, 
Humphreys, and Rotshtein (2007) presented a shape cue (e.g., a red square) after which participants 
indicated which of two shapes contained a target stimulus. When the target appeared in the cued 
shape, responses were faster than then it appeared in an uncued shape, but only when participants 
were required to hold the cue in working memory throughout the trial. These behavioural effects 
have neural analogues: mere repetition of the cue decreased activity in a network including the 
parahippocampal gyrus, lingual gyrus, and superior frontal gyrus – akin to the repetition-suppression 
discussed above -- but when the cue was actively maintained its re-occurrence caused increased 
activity in these areas 
These studies all fit with the idea that judged duration is positively related to the 
accessibility and clarity of perceptual representations – that is, with the processing principle. 
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Maintaining feature-representations in an active state, ready for a subsequent memory test, means 
that stimuli containing those features are processed more rapidly and accurately (with a 
corresponding enhancement of neural activity) (Soto et al., 2007), and these stimuli are judged to 
last longer (Pan & Luo, 2012). As yet, researchers have not integrated these effects in a single 
paradigm. It would be productive to adapt the procedure of Soto et al. (2007) to include a temporal 
judgment task and to see whether the improved processing and enhanced neural responding for 
features in working memory directly map on to increased subjective duration.  
 
Long-term memory 
Encoding a stimulus into long-term memory typically expands its apparent duration when it 
is re-presented. This was demonstrated by Witherspoon and Allan (1985), who presented 
participants with a list of 80 words for 1 s per word. When participants later classified the durations 
of words presented for 30 or 50 ms each, words from the studied list were judged to last longer than 
novel ones. Masson and Caldwell (1998) found the same effect using a similar design, but where 
participants generated the studied words from semantic cues, and Paller, Mayes, McDermott, 
Pickering, & Meudell (1991) found the effect in amnesic patients.  
Witherspoon and Allan (1985) attributed their data to a version of the processing principle, 
suggesting that studied items are easier to process and seem more familiar, and that this ease-of-
processing is interpreted by the participant as evidence that the item must have been presented for 
a longer duration -- in the same way that making an item easier to read can lead to the belief that it 
has been recently studied (e.g., Whittlesea, 1993). Consistent with this, when Witherspoon and Allan 
had participants identify the test words immediately before making their duration judgments, the 
studied words were better identified as well as seeming to last longer. The improved processing of 
recent items can, like the expectation-effects discussed above, be construed in terms of the 
predictability of forthcoming stimuli: in the environment, recently-encountered items are likely to 
occur again in the immediate future, and the dynamics of long-term memory retrieval are tuned to 
this statistical structure (Anderson and Schooler, 1991).  
These long-term memory effects have been generalized to longer durations and alternative 
tasks. Ono and Kawahara (2008) had participants study words and then presented a mix of studied 
items, novel items, and ‘critical lures’ which were semantically associated with the studied words. 
Participants had to press a button to terminate presentation after each test word had been 
displayed for 2.5 s. Temporal productions were shorter for studied than for novel items, implying 
longer subjective duration, and this effect generalized to the critical lures, suggesting that 
conceptual processing underlies the memory effect.   
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An exception the usual pattern comes from Ono and Kawahara (2005), who repeated dot 
patterns across trials and found that participants did not recognize the repeated displays, but that 
these stimuli had shorter apparent duration than novel ones – akin to the repetition effects in 
oddball tasks and studies of low-level adaptation. This might indicate that conscious recognition is 
necessary for the expansive effects of long-term memory, but unfortunately this study used a 
production methodology, so the shorter productions for familiar patterns might simply indicate that 
participants became bored of looking at them more rapidly (Matthews, 2011c). Nonetheless, the 
expansive effect for recognizable stimuli, and the compressive effect for unrecognized repeats, 
echoes the difference between active maintenance and passive exposure seen in studies of working 
memory. 
Finally, pre-existing long-term representations also expand subjective duration. Familiar, 
high-frequency words presented for 1 s are judged longer than low-frequency words (Warm, 
Greenberg, & Dube, 1964; Warm & McCray, 1969; see also Devane, 1974), and briefly-presented 
words are judged longer than non-words (e.g., Reingold & Merikle, 1988; Reber, Zimmermann, & 
Wurtz, 2004) – although these effects are sometimes fragile (see Reber et al., 2004 for discussion).  
Again, these findings support the generalization that conditions which facilitate non-temporal 
perceptual processing and information-extraction also increase duration judgments. 
These long-term memory effects suggest the straightforward prediction is that variables 
which affect memory retrieval (e.g., recency, interference, depth of encoding) will produce 
corresponding changes in apparent duration. This provides a useful direction for future work. If both 
retrieval and subjective duration were tested in an experiment that varies the study-test retention 
interval, for example, would we see a pattern of time-judgments that mimics the forgetting curve? 
And does providing more retrieval cues at test expand apparent duration as well as improving recall? 
There are also practical questions: does an eyewitness’ report of how long they saw a suspect’s face 
depend on how familiar they are with him or her, for example?  
 
The relevance of subjective time to memory researchers 
Memory researchers have made considerable efforts towards understanding the links 
between prior exposure and subjective duration, primarily via studies of the fluency heuristic (e.g., 
Whittlesea, 1993). The results reviewed here show that will be worth pursuing these inter-
relationships further – and in different directions -- in future.  
As one example: the evidence that recent and distant-past exposure have opposite effects 
on subjective time means that perceived duration may constitute a useful dependent variable when 
considering whether retention over short and long time intervals rest on distinct structures and 
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processes (e.g., Davelaar, Goshen-Gottstein, Ashkenazi, Haarmann, & Usher, 2005) or are best 
described with unitary frameworks (e.g., G.D.A. Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007; Spurgeon, Ward, & 
Matthews, 2014). As noted, systematically charting the time course of the transition from decreasing 
to increasing subjective duration – ideally using the kinds of verbal material and recall test 
procedures common to studies of memory -- would provide a useful first step. 
Studies of time perception could also inform long-standing debates about the contributions 
to forgetting of trace decay, interference from intervening or preceding items, and the temporal 
distinctiveness of the stimuli (G.D.A. Brown & Lewandowsky, 2010). For example, the temporal-
distinctiveness SIMPLE model posits that the discriminability of two items depends on the ratio of 
their respective retention intervals (G.D.A. Brown et al., 2007). This scalar property is supported by 
studies of timing, but where Brown and colleagues simply assume a log-transformation of retention 
interval, time perception researchers offers detailed neural and information-processing mechanisms 
by which the scalar property arises (e.g., Allman et al., 2014; Hass & Durstewitz, 2014; Oprisan & 
Buhusi, 2014). Moreover, they have identified conditions under which it is violated (e.g., Allman & 
Meck, 2012; Grondin, 2014; Wearden & Lejeune, 2008) – conditions that might therefore produce 
corresponding changes in retrieval performance, necessitating some adjustment to the memory 
model.  
The processing principle also provides a new perspective on forgetting rates and 
interference effects. Specifically, the forgetting curve might best be understood in terms of 
subjective time, with the effects of intervening items on retrieval of a target being mediated by 
changes in the apparent duration of the retention interval – changes which can be predicted from 
the processing principle described in the present review. A straightforward way to explore this 
possibility would be to elicit subjective duration measures for the individual stimuli that fill a 
retention interval (or judgments of the interval as a whole). 
A similar idea applies to the effects of exposure time at the encoding stage. Longer exposure 
durations boost accuracy in recognition memory tasks (e.g., Tversky & Sherman, 1975); but perhaps 
it is apparent, not physical, encoding duration which best predicts performance? According to the 
processing principle, subjective time is positively related to perceptual clarity and information-
extraction and should therefore index the strength and detail of the stimulus representation that 
underlies subsequent recognition performance. Correspondingly, the effects of basic stimulus 
properties and encoding conditions that affect recognition (e.g, luminance; Loftus, 1985) will be 
partly mediated by the apparent duration of the items. Again, this idea could readily be tested by 
correlating measures of the subjective duration of each item at encoding with subsequent memory 
performance for that item. We predict that item-level subjective duration would add predictive 
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 We have grouped the effects in this section under the heading ‘memory’, but they reflect a 
number of processes including sensory adaptation and attention. More generally, our division of this 
review into separate sections dealing with ‘perception’, ‘attention’, and ‘memory’ is a convenient 
organizing device; it is clear by this point that these processes are deeply inter-linked, with complex, 
inter-connected effects on time perception. 
Correspondingly, prior experience with a stimulus has multiple, conflicting effects on 
subjective duration. Even brief exposure can produce adaptation, reducing the perceptual strength 
of the adapted stimulus and compressing the apparent duration of repeated features. This is often 
spatially-specific and short-lived, and probably reflects a basic change in neural sensitivity early in 
the processing pathway that reduces the effective magnitude of the input – an internal counterpart 
to the effects of stimulus intensity discussed in Section 2. Similarly, repeated stimuli may seem 
briefer than novel ones because of early attentional selection of new or unexpected objects: as we 
saw in Section 2, difference-from-background (salience) provides a useful description of the stimulus 
properties that expand duration, and repeated items are less distinctive than novel ones.  Set against 
this, stimuli which match an existing mnemonic representation are processed more efficiently. 
Moreover, repetition can generate the expectation that the item will occur again, a form of cuing 
effect that, like those surveyed in Section 3, allows the observer to direct resources to the 
appropriate modality, spatiotemporal location, or region of feature space – boosting perceptual 
strength and expanding subjective time. These effects are all modulated by expectations and task 
demands; anticipating stimulus repetition and/or maintaining an active representation in working 
memory will influence the balance between compressive and expansive effects of past encoding.  
 This complexity makes it difficult to predict the effects of a given memory/prior-exposure 
manipulation, but the available data nonetheless suggest that apparent duration tracks perceptual 
clarity and the ease of information-extraction. That is, prior exposure effects generally accord with 
the processing principle.  
 
Section 5: Implications and Extensions 
This review has highlighted how the experience of time is intimately connected with other 
perceptual and cognitive processes, and has offered the processing principle as a useful 
generalization for conceptualizing these effects and for generating future research questions. In this 
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final section we discuss some implications and extensions of the results surveyed above, focusing on 
(1) extensions to other empirical phenomena, (2) theoretical models of timing, and (3) broader 
issues regarding the function of subjective time. 
 
Empirical Extensions: Other Determinants of Subjective Time 
The experience of time depends on factors not considered in the body of this review. Of 
particular interest is the finding that repetitive stimulation – usually a series of auditory ‘clicks’ 
presented at the rate of 5 per second for a few seconds – can evoke a generalized change in the 
apparent duration of subsequent stimuli. Building on work by Treisman, Faulkner, Naish, and Brogan 
(1990), Penton-Voak, Edwards, Wearden, & Percival (1996) found that the estimated duration of a 
light lasting 1183 ms was ~760 ms when the stimulus was preceded by 5-seconds of silence, but 
~910 ms when it was preceded by 5-seconds of a 5-Hz click-train. Auditory click-trains expand the 
duration both of auditory and of visual stimuli in a variety of judgment tasks and across species, 
irrespective of whether the target interval is filled or unfilled, and seems to depend on the frequency 
of the repetitive stimulation (Cheng, Dyke, McConnell, & Meck, 2011; Penton-Voak et al., 1996; 
Wearden et al., 1998, 2007; interestingly, Repp, Mendlowitz, & Hove, 2013, did not find the click-
train effect in expert musicians). 
Recent work suggests that this expansion of subjective time might be accompanied by more 
rapid information-processing. Jones, Allely, and Wearden (2011) presented a variety of cognitive 
tasks, where the start of each trial consisted of a 5-s interval demarcated by two beeps. When this 
interval was filled with a 5 Hz click train, subsequent task performance was better than when it was 
silent or filled with white noise: As well as being faster to detect which of four boxes contained a 
target and solving mathematics problems more rapidly, participants did better on tasks where 
performance was not indexed by the speed of a motor response. Specifically, they 
encoded/retrieved more letters in Sperling’s (1960) classic iconic memory task, and pictures that 
were preceded by clicks were subsequently better recognized in a long-term memory test.  
The mechanism for these effects is unclear. Wearden and colleagues posit acceleration of an 
internal clock (e.g., Penton-Voak et al., 1996), presumably with the additional assumption that the 
rate of this clock sets the tempo for other mental operations. A potential problem is that more rapid 
click trains seem to have less effect than slower ones (e.g., Jones et al., 2011). A related possibility is 
that external stimulation entrains cortical oscillations that might underlie both the experience of 
time (e.g., McAuley & Jones, 2003) and other cognitive processes (see Burle, Macar, Bonnet, 2003; 
Henry & Herrmann, 2014, for reviews).  
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From our perspective, repetitive stimulation provides another instance of the processing 
principle: improved information extraction corresponds to increased apparent duration. Researchers 
have not yet combined the time-judgment and cognitive-processing effects of click trains in a single 
study, but we predict a tight correspondence between the two effects, both across experimental 
conditions and trial-by-trial during the task. An interesting adjunct to the click-train effect is the 
recent finding that repetitive stimulation after a stimulus reduces its apparent duration (Ono & 
Kitazawa, 2010b, 2011). The reasons are unclear, but the processing principle suggests that the click 
trains make it harder to extract information from the preceding stimulus, perhaps by displacing 
relevant representations from working memory. Again, this leads to the testable prediction that 
non-temporal perceptual judgments about the target stimulus will be impaired in the click-train 
condition. 
 More broadly, the processing principle might extend to other pre-stimulus variables that are 
known to affect apparent duration, such as the change in emotional state that comes from viewing a 
threatening image (Shi, Jia, & Müller, 2012) or anticipating an aversive event (Droit-Volet,  
Mermillod, Cocenas-Silva, & Gil, 2010). It will be important to test whether the target stimuli are also 
more/less efficiently processed in these situations, in a way that maps on to the changes in apparent 
duration. Moreover, some pre-stimulus manipulations reduce the accessibility of subsequent stimuli: 
emotionally-negative images, for example, can impair the processing of later stimuli in rapid serial 
visual presentation paradigms (Most, Chun, Widders, & Zald, 2005); the processing principle implies 
that the subjective durations of these targets will likewise be compressed. Finally, it will be 
productive to relate the changes in time judgment that are brought about by physiological and 
pharmacological manipulations (e.g., Lake & Meck, 2013) to changes in other perceptual, 
attentional, and memory processes.  
 
Models of Timing 
How should the links between subjective time and other mental processes be 
accommodated within theories of human interval timing? We described existing theoretical 
accounts of specific data above; we now briefly discuss how three general accounts of timing might 
in future be extended to accommodate the full set of findings. 
Pacemaker-accumulator models. Most internal clock models posit a dedicated pacemaker, 
but the general framework of pulse-accumulation can be separated from this assumption. Indeed, 
some mathematical models focus on the counting process without explicitly stating the source of the 
neural pulses (e.g., Creelman, 1962; Rammsayer & Ulrich, 2001).  
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One possibility is that the pulses come from the units representing the stimulus. That is, 
subjective time might correspond to the accumulated activity of the neurons whose firing forms the 
‘top level’ stimulus-representation. To the extent that stimulus and cognitive variables modulate this 
representation, they will affect the perception of time – as per the processing principle. Moreover, 
the assumption that increases in subjective duration would correspond to more neural firing for the 
relevant stimulus representation is similar to the coding efficiency account of Eagleman and 
Pariyadath (2009).  
A problem with this approach is that it requires the organism to monitor the accumulated 
activity of all on-going stimulus representations. The physiological implausibility of unlimited 
accumulation is a problem even for a dedicated pacemaker (Simen, Balci, deSouza, Cohen, and 
Holmes, 2011b; Simen et al., 2013); it is even more difficult to envisage every stimulus 
representation having its own accumulator (or that there is a central store for the accumulation of 
activity across all current representations). Furthermore, as we saw when discussing the coding 
efficiency hypothesis, there is unlikely to be a simple relationship between processing efficiency, 
neural firing rates, and subjective duration. 
Recent work has sought to connect pacemaker-accumulator models of timing to a broader 
information-processing framework (van Rijn, Gu, & Meck, 2014). Specifically, Taatgen, van Rijn, and 
Anderson (2007) embedded a pacemaker-accumulator timing system the ACT-R architecture 
(Anderson et al., 2004). ACT-R is an elaborate model that comprises a central procedural memory 
module connected to a range of processing modules via limited-capacity buffers; it has been used to 
model a wide range of cognitive tasks, including memory, attention, language processing, and 
problem-solving (Anderson et al., 2004). Taatgen et al. introduced a ‘temporal module’ comprising a 
pacemaker whose noisy inter-pulse intervals increase over time. They were able to model dual-task 
interference effects on timing by variously assuming interruption of the timing process itself and 
competition among timing and non-timing tasks for access to declarative memory; they later used 
ACT-R’s memory processes to model the interference between memories for different time intervals 
(Taatgen & van Rijn, 2011) and the timing of overlapping intervals (van Rijn & Taatgen, 2008), 
although recent work in this area suggests that the model needs some modification (Bryce & 
Bratzke, in press; Bryce, Seifried-Dübon, & Bratzke, 2015; Matthews, 2013.) It is not clear how the 
ACT-R framework could incorporate the wealth of effects described in this review, but the fact that it 
has been applied to psychophysical (e.g., Petrov & Anderson, 2005), attentional (e.g., Anderson, 
Matessa, & Lebiere, 1997), and memory (e.g., Pavlik & Anderson, 2005) processes like those that 
affect subjective time suggest that, with appropriate assumptions about interactions between the 
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timing module and other components of the system, an integrated account might be developed in 
future.  
Oscillator models. A pacemaker-accumulator system is not the only type of dedicated timing 
mechanism. An alternative class of theory posits oscillator-based timing. In particular, Miall (1989) 
argued that the duration of an arbitrary interval could be encoded by having a set of neural 
oscillators, each with a different period, and detecting which subset of these units was active at the 
time when the interval ended; different intervals would correspond to the coincident activity of 
different sub-populations of oscillators. 
Matell and Meck (2000, 2004) developed this idea into a full neurobiological model of 
interval timing, the striatal beat frequency (SBF) model. In the SBF model, the oscillators are cortical 
neurons whose phases are reset by dopaminergic input from the ventral tegmental area (VTA) at the 
onset of a to-be-timed interval. Coincident activity among the oscillators is detected by medium 
spiny neurons (MSNs) in the striatum; each MSN cell receive a large number of inputs from the 
cortex and thalamus, and the weight of its synaptic connections with the various oscillators 
determines the duration that it encodes. The neurobiological structure of the model is supported by 
a range of electrophysiological, pharmacological, and lesion studies (e.g., Coull, Cheng, & Meck, 
2011; Oprisan & Buhusi, 2011), as well as psychophysical, brain-imaging, and patient work (e.g., 
Allman & Meck, 2012; Hashimoto & Yotsumoto, 2015; Merchant, Harrington, & Meck, 2013). 
Recent work has drawn connections between the SBF model and the neural mechanisms of 
working memory (Lustig, Matell, & Meck, 2005). In particular, oscillating cortical activity has been 
argued to play a key role in maintaining active working memory representations (e.g., Fuentemilla, 
Penny, Cashdollar, Bunzeck, & Düzel, 2010; Lee, Simpson, Logothetis, & Rainer, 2005; Lisman & 
Idiart, 1995; see Roux & Uhlhaas, 2014, for a recent review), raising the possibility that information 
about stimulus identity may be encoded by which subset of cortical neurons is firing, while 
information about stimulus duration is extracted from the pattern of coincident activity. Gu, van 
Rijn, and Meck (2015) have recently produced a formal model and simulations that illustrate this 
possibility (Figure 5). 
We saw above that apparent duration is expanded for items that are held in working 
memory, as part of the broader principle that conditions which facilitate perceptual processing 
lengthen the subjective duration of the stimulus. By modelling timing and working memory in a 
single framework, the SBF model provides a potential mechanism for this effect. Furthermore, the 
modulation of cortical oscillations by attention (Jensen, Kaiser, & Lachaux, 2007) and their links both 
to the prediction of forthcoming stimuli (Arnal & Giroud, 2012) and to the formation of coherent 
object representations (Tallon-Baudry & Bertrand, 1999) mean that it might be possible to 
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incorporate many of the variables that affect subjective time within a single neurobiological model. 
As yet, this suggestion is purely speculative, but the framework described by Gu et al. (2015) 
provides a useful starting point.  
Sequential sampling models. A different integrative approach would link subjective duration 
to sequential sampling models, which provide the dominant framework for perceptual decision-
making. These models predict both choices and response times by assuming that information is 
successively sampled from the percept to drive the decision process (see Ratcliff & Smith, 2004, for a 
review). The most famous example is the drift diffusion model (Ratcliff, 1978; Ratcliff & McKoon, 
2008), wherein sampling drives a time-continuous random walk that terminates when the 
accumulated information crosses one of two boundaries, each corresponding to a different 
perceptual decision. The drift rate determines the net rate of information accumulation in favour of 
one response and depends upon the features of the stimulus (e.g., the signal-to-noise ratio), with a 
high drift rate entailing fast and accurate decisions and a low rate entailing noisy evidence 
accumulation and slower, less accurate judgments. The distance between the response boundaries, 
and the relative location of the starting point between these boundaries, correspond to the decision-
maker’s caution and bias, respectively (Figure 6, top).  
Drift diffusion models have been applied to a large array of tasks (see Donkin, Brown, 
Heathcote, & Wagenmakers, 2011), but historically they have not been linked to temporal 
judgments. However, Simen, Balci, deSouza, Cohen, and Holmes (2011a) and Rivest and Benjio 
(2011) have recently and independently developed time-adaptive drift diffusion models (TDDMs) of 
interval timing (Figure 6, bottom). These models can be conceptualized by imagining a person 
walking towards a barrier, where each step is perturbed by Gaussian noise. The distance from the 
start provides the measure of elapsed time; if the steps are small (a low mean drift-rate), the 
distance will be lower and subjective time will elapse more slowly. 
The TDDM models assume that the drift rate adapts so that the barrier is reached at a target 
time (e.g., so that a lever is pressed at the time when this action will be rewarded), and incorporate 
the scalar property by assuming that the Gaussian noise increases in proportion to the drift rate 
(Simen et al., 2011, 2013, provide a neural mechanism for this assumption). The models correctly 
predict that behavioural response times will follow an inverse Gaussian distribution, with a level of 
skew that is approximately three times the coefficient of variation (Simen et al., 2013), and can also 
capture one-trial learning (Simen et al., 2011) and learning of cyclically-varying time intervals 
(Luzardo, Ludvig, & Rivest, 2013). These diffusion models therefore accommodate a variety of key 
findings from timing research within the same basic framework as other forms of perceptual 
decision-making (albeit with important differences between the two classes of model). 
55 
 
In the TDDMs, the diffusion process exists purely to time the interval, but might it be 
possible to develop an integrated account, where the diffusion process that underlies perceptual 
decisions also provides the basis for the subjective duration of the stimulus? In perceptual decision-
making, higher drift rates correspond to more efficient extraction of perceptual information, and 
modelling has shown that the drift rate parameter rises when conditions are favourable for 
processing (e.g., with high-contrast stimuli or familiar items e.g., Ratcliff, Gomez, & McKoon, 2004; 
Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998); in TDDMs, higher drift rates mean that the process will be further from the 
start after a given physical interval, corresponding to longer apparent duration. Thus, diffusion 
models may provide an over-arching mathematical framework for the processing principle described 
in this review – a framework that quantifiably links responses and reaction times in decision tasks to 
the precision and accuracy of subjective time. 
 
The Teleology of Subjective Time 
The labiality of duration judgments is often treated, at least implicitly, as a flaw or 
shortcoming, with non-temporal variables producing ‘bias’, ‘distortions’, or ‘illusions’ (e.g., 
Eagleman, 2008). While accurate timing is generally desirable, it is worth asking: is the instability of 
subjective duration an entirely negative and unavoidable consequence of flawed timekeeping, or 
might it serve – or reflect – some more adaptive process? 
This question is particularly apposite for theories that posit a dedicated internal clock. We 
have seen that researchers frequently attribute the effects of non-temporal variables on subjective 
time to changes in the rate of a pacemaker, for example. But why should this be? What is the point 
of a dedicated timing device if all manner of external factors change its accuracy? As we have seen, 
one possibility is that the clock entails monitoring ongoing internal and external activity and, as such, 
is inseparable from non-temporal information. Irrespective of this idea, recent work has illustrated 
the optimality of human and animal timing (Balci, Freestone, & Gallistel, 2009; Balci et al., 2011; Shi, 
Church, & Meck, 2014), and we can ask: Is there some functional value to the flexibility of subjective 
time? 
We briefly consider two possibilities, both of which are grounded in the principle that 
subjective duration is expanded by conditions that render a stimulus representation more accessible 
and vivid.  
First, apparent duration might index the significance or importance of a stimulus, in the 
same way that the tingle of fear or the glow of pleasure provides a subjective marker of an item’s 
behavioural relevance. Indeed, this suggestion generalizes the proposal by Droit-Volet and Gil (2009) 
that the effects of emotion on perceived duration reflect “the excellent ability of the internal clock 
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to adapt to events in the environment” (p. 1950). The conditions that expand apparent duration are 
those that facilitate information extraction, and these are also the conditions that typically signal 
behavioural significance – for example, proximity, magnitude, uniqueness, and being the focus of 
attention. This point is especially clear for factors such as looming motion and threatening faces, 
where behavioural relevance, efficient information processing, and expanded duration go hand in 
hand. Thus, the feeling that a stimulus lasted for a long time might be a useful subjective index of its 
importance, one which can combine with other perceptual, affective, and motivational cues to 
determine the optimum course of action.  
A second possibility emphasizes the probability of a given stimulus having a particular 
physical duration, rather than its utility. The cognitive system is increasingly treated as a Bayesian 
optimizer that combines noisy sensory input with prior information about the likely state of the 
world (see, for example, Kersten, Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004, and Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, & 
Goodman, 2011). In the context of time perception, this approach is exemplified by Jazayeri and 
Shadlen (2010), who found that temporal reproductions increase linearly with target time, but that 
they gravitate towards the average of the durations in the experimental session. Jazayeri and 
Shadlen provided a new perspective on this long-established central tendency by showing that it can 
be described by a Bayesian model in which the observer integrates a noisy representation of the 
stimulus with prior information about the stimulus distribution to produce a posterior distribution 
for the to-be-judged duration, which provides the basis for judgment (Figure 7, top panel). 
Importantly, the central tendency effect is greatest for the longest duration sets -- the conditions 
under which timing is most variable, and when it therefore makes most sense to use prior 
information. Moreover, modelling shows that, when time measurements are less precise because of 
sensory modality or expertise, the observer uses a narrower prior probability distribution, giving 
more weight to the mean of the stimulus set when forming a judgment (Cicchini, Arrighi, Cecchetti, 
Giusti, & Burr, 2012; see Figure 7, bottom panel). 
One possibility, then, is that the shifts in apparent duration caused by non-temporal 
perception, attention, and memory reflect the combination of noisy time representations with prior 
information about the probable state of the world. Subjective time would be a ‘best guess’ about the 
likely true duration, and factors that expand the apparent duration of a given interval do so because 
they usually occur when physical duration really is longer. This would be similar to the role of fluency 
in memory judgments, where “feelings of familiarity are the product of an unconscious interpretive 
process that attributes fluent processing to a plausible source” (Whittlesea, 1993, p. 1248). Because 
longer exposure typically improves perceptual representations, the positive association between 
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subjective time and information-extraction could reflect a rational perceptual inference in the face 
of imperfect temporal measurement.  
This Bayesian approach could in principle be tested by careful scrutiny of environmental 
structure. The emergence of wearable technologies that record the sights and sounds people 
experience each day (e.g., mobile eye-trackers) means that it should be possible to analyse a large 
body of ecological data to see whether, for example, there is a positive correlation between 
exposure time and the size or intensity of briefly-viewed objects. Given that larger objects are often 
slower-moving (and would therefore take longer to become occluded), there might be, but it is 
impossible to know from first principles. An interesting consideration is that humans partly control 
the physical duration of the stimuli to which they are exposed – for example, by choosing what to 
look at or hold on to. These actions facilitate the extraction of information from the stimulus – which 
we have seen is an over-arching determinant of subjective duration – so subjective time biases could 
reflect the legitimate prior belief that accessible, perceptually-vivid stimuli are encountered for 
longer periods of time. 
The idea that subjective duration distortions result from best guesses about the state of the 
world could also be tested by creating micro-environments in the experimental session, where 
different non-temporal features probabilistically co-occur with longer or shorter intervals. For 
example, over time, we would expect duration estimates to be shortened for stimuli comprising 
features that typically predict short exposure, and it should be possible to combine stimulus features 
with different priors to test whether the integration of prior information is optimal. Moreover, the 
effects of non-temporal cues should depend both on their reliability (that is, on the variability in the 
prior) and on the variability of the time interval (greater endogenous or exogenous uncertainty 
should increase reliance on the non-temporal information; Cicchini et al., 2012) – and both effects 
could be formally modelled to test the Bayesian framework. 
 
The value of the Processing Principle 
We have suggested that perceptual strength provides the basis for subjective duration: more 
vivid representations are judged to last longer. This processing principle is a wide-ranging  and 
general precept: it unites the effects on subjective time of stimulus intensity, salience, and 
magnitude; endogenous and exogenous spatial, temporal, and feature-based attention; expectation, 
immediate repetition, and long-term memory.  
The processing principle has not previously been advanced as a unifying account of 
subjective time. Rather, the effects of perceptual, attentional, and mnemonic factors on apparent 
duration have typically been considered in isolation, with specific theories advanced to account for 
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specific effects – for example, the notion of a “common magnitude system” that does not speak to 
the effects of non-magnitude sensory properties, attention, or memory, or an “attentional 
allocation” model that does not capture the effect of perceptual properties or prior representations. 
Alternatively, the effects of non-temporal variables have been explained within general-purpose 
internal-clock frameworks which do not offer any basis for predicting which variables will affect time 
or how – for example, by asserting that a manipulation “speeds up the internal pacemaker”. One 
strength of the processing principle is that it is both wide-ranging -- encompassing the effects of 
perceptual properties, attention, and memory -- and specific, in that we can predict the directional 
influence of a given manipulation by independently investigating how it affects perceptual clarity. 
Variables that improve detection, identification, and discrimination, and/or which increase the 
reported vividity of the stimulus representation, are predicted to expand apparent duration. Those 
which impair information extraction or reduce vividity will have the opposite effect.  
This predictive power means that the processing principle provides a useful framework for 
future work: we can seek new factors that will expand/contract subjective time based on their 
known effects on perceptual strength. Indeed, the principle generates more specific predictions and 
questions in the fields of perception, attention, and memory, as described above. More generally, it 
sets an ambitious agenda for the development of formal models which unify subjective time with 
the information extraction that underlies performance on other tasks. We have outlined some 




Time is a special dimension, but its mental representation is fundamentally linked to other 
perceptual and cognitive processes. By surveying how subjective time is affected by other stimulus 
properties, the allocation of processing resources, and the existence of prior stimulus 
representations, we hope to encourage cross-disciplinary empirical research and integrated 
theorizing. We have suggested the processing principle as one potentially useful framework for this 
work, but in any case the empirical links between time, perception, attention, and memory hold the 
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Figure 1. Illustrations of time-scale invariance. The top-left panel plots data from a temporal 
generalization task in which participants classified tones as “same” or “different” from an encoded 
standard duration. Each line represents performance with a different standard. The top-right panel 
plots the same data after dividing the test durations by the standard duration; the generalization 
gradients superimpose, illustrating scale invariance. (Adapted from Wearden et al., 1997).  The 
bottom-left panel shows data from a task in which participants classified durations as closer to 
“short” or “long” anchor durations; each line indicates a different pair of anchors (e.g., 0.75, 1 = 
short anchor was 0.75 seconds, long anchor was 1.0 seconds). The bottom-right panel plots the 
same data when the stimulus durations have been normalized by the relevant bisection point. Again, 





















Figure 2. The processing principle. Perceptual representations depend on the confluence of external 
stimulation and internal processing. Incoming sensory information may differ in intrinsic signal 
strength (indicated by the differing widths of the input arrows) but will also be moderated by 
relations between the inputs (indicated by horizontal arrows), by the allocation of processing 
capacity (attention), and by the presence of existing stimulus representations (memory). These 
stimulus, attentional, and mnemonic factors will be inter-related, and their inter-play determines 
the effective clarity of the final percept – the vividity of the representation and the ease with which 
information can be extracted from it to make decisions about stimulus identity, category 
membership, and so forth. As an empirical generalization, the conditions that promote perceptual 

















Figure 3. Some examples of how basic perceptual properties affect subjective time. Panel A: 
Subjective duration is longer for more intense electrical stimulation. The plot compares temporal 
magnitude estimates for periods of electrical stimulation of the skin at low intensity (1.5 times 
threshold) and high intensity (3.5 times threshold) (Adapted from Ekman et al., 1966). Panel B: 
Against a dark background, verbal estimates of duration are greater for bright lights bright (134 

















































































































































































presented in silence, verbal duration estimates are larger for loud (80 dB) than for quiet (59 dB) 
stimuli. (Adapted from Matthews et al., 2011). Panel D: mean reproductions are larger for large 
(10.0 degrees) squares than for small (1.2 degrees) squares. (Data from Rammsayer & Verner, 2014). 
Panel E: Verbal duration estimates are longer for drifting gratings that move fast (15 degrees/s) than 
for those that move slowly (5 degrees/s). (Adapted from Makin et al., 2012). Panel F: Reproduced 
durations were longer for squares that flicker at high frequency (12 Hz) than for those flickering at 
low frequency (2 Hz). (Data from Kanai et al., 2006). Panel G. Verbal estimates are longer for 
intervals filled with a continuous tone than for silent intervals demarcated by two brief clicks. 
(Adapted from Wearden et al., 2007). Panel H. Verbal estimates for auditory stimuli (here a 500-Hz 
tone) are often longer than those for visual stimuli (here a blue square), although this effect may 
well depend on the specific auditory/visual stimuli that are compared (see main text). (Adapted from 











































Figure 4. Three models for time perception. (A) A generic pacemaker-accumulator framework 
(modelled after Gibbon et al., 1984; Treisman, 2013; Wearden, 2004). A dedicated pacemaker emits 
pulses; timing begins when a switch closes, allowing the pulses to flow into an accumulator, and 
ends when the switch opens again. Both the effective flow of pulses and the operation of the switch 
may depend on sustained attention to the stimulus. The accumulated pulses form the 
representation of subjective duration and may be transferred to working memory and thence to 
long-term storage (not all models posit separate working memory and accumulator components). 
Temporal decisions are based on comparison of the working memory representation with 
previously-encoded pulse-counts. Non-temporal stimulus properties may affect subjective duration 
by altering the rate of the pacemaker and/or the latency of the switch. (B) A “common metric” 
framework in which time, space, and quantity (including symbolic numbers) have shared neural 
representations, perhaps in the parietal cortex, as the result of the relevance of these dimensions 
for action. Subjective time is therefore inextricably linked to the measurement of non-temporal 
magnitude. (Adapted from Walsh, 2003). (C) A coding-efficiency account. Subjective time may be 
directly related to the total energy expended encoding the stimulus, such that stimulus properties 
which evoke a larger neural response have longer apparent duration. The figure plots data from a 
magnetoencephalography (MEG) study by Noguchi and Kakigi (2006) and shows how the evoked 
response was larger for stimuli that were classified as “long” than for those judged “short”, despite 





















Figure 5. Cortical oscillations as the basis for temporal and identity information. The top panel shows 
the striatal beat frequency model. Cortical neurons oscillating at different frequencies project on to 
striatal spiny neurons. The set of oscillators which are active at the time of a relevant signal (e.g., 
stimulus offset) provide the code for duration. The lower panel illustrates how theta and gamma 
cortical oscillations may also underlie the maintenance of stimulus representations in working 
memory: individual items are encoded in the spatial pattern of cells firing within a given gamma 
cycle, with the whole sequence repeated on subsequent theta cycles – and with the capacity of 
short-term memory dependent on the number of items that can be “fit” into each theta cycle. 
Recent modelling has shown that working memory representations and timing can be encoded in a 
single oscillator-based framework, with different dimensions of the neural oscillations providing the 
basis for item, order, and duration information. Adapted from Gu et al. (2015). 
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Figure 6. Drift-diffusion models of perceptual decision-making and timing. The top panel illustrates a 
drift-diffusion model of two-alternative decision-making. Each irregular line represents one iteration 
of the decision process, a time-continuous random walk that terminates when it reaches one of two 
absorbing barriers corresponding to the response alternatives (e.g., “word” and “non-word”). The 
histograms show the distribution of first-passage times for the two barriers which, in combination 
with the time taken for non-decisional processes, will determine the RTs for each type of response. 
Stronger perceptual evidence entails reduced noise and a higher mean drift rate, such the process 
will be more likely to reach the correct barrier (higher accuracy) and will take less time to do so 
(shorter RTs). (Adapted from Dutilh, Krypotos, & Magenmakers, 2011). The bottom panel illustrates 
a time-adaptive drift diffusion model (TDDM) of interval timing. The distance from the start provides 
the measure of time, and there is a single, fixed absorbing barrier. Learning to time an interval 
entails adjusting the drift rate such that the barrier is reached after the appropriate physical time 
has elapsed (indicated by the curved arrow showing the adjustment that would be made for the next 






















Figure 7. “Contextual calibration” of time estimates. The top panel shows the ideal observer model 
of Jazayeri and Shadlen (2010) in which the Gaussian likelihood function for the current duration 
(dark gray line) is combined with a uniform prior distribution of durations experienced during the 
test session (light gray line) to obtain a posterior distribution (black line). In this account, the prior 
provides perfect information about the range of experienced durations, assigning zero weight to 
durations outside that range. The centre of mass of the posterior distribution (Barycenter) provides 
the observer’s estimate of the stimulus. The bottom panel shows a refined model in which the prior 
is itself a Gaussian distribution, reflecting uncertainty about the stimulus distribution; the form of 
this prior can differ between observers and conditions (Cicchini et al., 2012). Adapted from Cicchini 
et al. (2012).  
